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Let’s Shake on it: Perceived Pre-contractual
Risk in Cross-border Investment
Kevin J. Fandl, J.D., Ph.D.*
This article asks whether a legal system that provides protection
for commitments made prior to contract formation is more or less
conducive to risk-taking by foreign investors than a legal system
that does not. I surmise that increased levels of protection for precontractual commitments establish an environment more
hospitable to new business development, giving potential
entrepreneurs added security in their ventures. And I further
surmise that different legal traditions provide different levels of
protection for these pre-contractual commitments.
To better understand the risks faced by cross-border business
investors, this article describes the key distinctions between legal
systems that create potential liability for an unwitting investor and
how they affect pre-contractual liability. It then links these risks
with levels of investment by performing a quantitative assessment
of the relationship between legal tradition and entrepreneurial
activity, followed by a contextual analysis of conversations with
cross-jurisdictional legal practitioners. It concludes by showing
the distinctions in pre-contractual liability rules between civil and
common law legal systems have a significant impact on potential
investment.

*
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INTRODUCTION
This article addresses whether perceived risks from the attachment of
liability during pre-contractual negotiations affects cross-border
investment. It addresses risks that result from differences in legal traditions
between common and civil law countries. These risks can be mitigated to
some extent by effective legal counsel; however, they may also serve as a
deterrent to potential entrepreneurs looking to business abroad.
Nobel laureate Douglass North identified the institutional
environment of a country as a significant factor in determining that
country’s economic growth trajectory. To North, institutions set forth the
“rules of the game,” which provided economic actors with predictable
legal and policy environments within which to operate. The more effective
the institutions, the more likely the economic growth.
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North identified contract enforcement as one of key aspects of
effective institutions.1 In the absence of state enforcement of contracts,
religious or moral concepts provide the only means of enforcement.2 The
rise of institutions such as courts and effective laws, along with improved
respect for the law—often termed “rule of law” 3—allowed for the
establishment of more complex and long-term contracts. The
predictability of contract enforcement became an incentive to trust beyond
a small circle of known associates.4
A key indicator of the strength of a society’s rule of law is the
effectiveness of contract enforcement in that society, a function of the
courts in most instances. A party’s trust in its legal institutions often
depends on whether those institutions will protect parties against unfair
dealing and contract breach.5 A positive societal perception of their
institutional strength and willingness to enforce contract law affects that
society’s economic performance by providing the guarantees necessary to
facilitate effective business development.6 Inefficient institutions,
therefore, fail to provide the environment necessary to sustain effective
business growth and economic development.
The idea that legal institutions play a role in facilitating an effective
commercial environment is not new.7 Political economist, Douglass North,
described institutions as the “humanly devised constraints that structure
political economic and social interaction” in 1991.8 In that article, North
used a number of commercial examples to explain the importance of
having effective legal institutions in place to protect transactions beyond
the small circle of family and known associates, allowing for long-distance

1

Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 97, 102 (1991)
(explaining that effective enforcement of contracts will permit more complex forms of
economic exchange).
2
Id. at 99 (describing religious precepts as establishing the “standards of conduct”
among parties in the absence of a state).
3
See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law, 2012
SING. J. OF LEGAL STUD. 232, 233.
4
See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Promises, Trust, and Contract Law, 47 AM. J. OF JURIS.
25, 29 (2002) (discussing the role of trust in facilitating contracts outside close networks).
5
See, e.g., Enforcing Contracts, WORLD BANK,
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/enforcing-contracts/good-practices (last
visited Jan. 29, 2019) (footnote omitted).
6
See Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1140 (1998)
[hereinafter LLSV]; see also Carmine Guerriero, Legal Traditions and Economic
Performances: Theory and Evidence (Nov. 14, 2010), ENCYC. OF LAW AND ECON.,
Francesco Parisi and Richard Posner, eds., (Forthcoming; Amsterdam Ctr. for Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 2010-12).
7
See generally, Douglass C. North, Institutions and Economic Theory, 36 THE AM.
ECON. 3 (1992).
8
North, supra note 1, at 97.
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trade.9 His theory built on previous work of Ronald Coase, who
highlighted the relationship between effective contract enforcement and
institutional quality.10
Later scholars built upon the work of Coase and North and began
connecting a state’s economic performance with not only the quality of its
institutions but to the legal system that those institutions enforce. A
controversial article written by a group of Harvard and University of
Chicago scholars in 1998, linked legal tradition with economic
performance and, more precisely, suggested that civil law traditions yield
less effective institutions than common law traditions.11 They expound
upon their “Legal Origins” theory in a more recent paper in which they
argue that civil law embraces “socially-conditioned private contracting”
whereas common law supports “unconditioned private contracting.”12
The resulting analysis from these scholars was integrated into the
World Bank’s Doing Business series, which advises about the investment
climate on the basis of a number of factors, including institutional
effectiveness.13 Institutional effectiveness, a measure of quality
governance, was measured in part by the effectiveness of contract
enforcement.14
Numerous excellent research papers and case studies explore the
relationship between legal tradition and business environment.15 They
assess elements such as institutional capacity, enforcement of contracts
and legal obligations, and transparency. Yet one element not sufficiently
addressed is the effect of distinct legal traditions on the pre-contractual
environment for doing business. In other words, does legal tradition
impact the willingness of a party to take the risk of engaging in potentially
9
Id. at 100 (“Such societies need effective, impersonal contract enforcement, because
personal ties, voluntaristic constraints, and ostracism are no longer effective as more
complex and impersonal forms of exchange emerge.”).
10
See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
11
Rafael La Porta, et al., The Quality of Government 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 6727, 1998) (finding that more government intervention, which is
associated with civil law governments, yields lower efficiency).
12
Rafael La Porta, et. al, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. OF ECON.
LIT. 285, 288 (2008); see also Katharina Pistor, Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and
Liberal Market Economies, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: CORPORATIONS,
STATES, AND MARKETS IN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE US (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 2006).
13
See Doing Business, WORLD BANK, www.doingbusiness.org (last visited Jan. 29,
2019).
14
See DOING BUSINESS, WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2018: REFORMING TO CREATE
JOBS 12 (2017) (identifying “Enforcing Contracts,” measured by the time and cost to
resolve disputes, as one of 11 areas of business regulation).
15
Ralf Michaels, Symposium on Legal Origins: Comparative Law By Numbers? Legal
Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and The Silence of Traditional Comparative Law,
57 AM. J. COMP. L. 765 (2009).
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risky business negotiations that may not result in a contract and that may,
ultimately, cause a party to change position in a way that causes them
harm?
A contract is not simply a set of formal promises made between
parties; it is a series of acts that bring parties together into a commercial
relationship. These acts may include letters of intent, oral negotiations,
non-disclosure agreements, draft versions of a final contract, and
ultimately the establishment of formal contract terms. All of these actions
require some risk and commitment of resources by the intending parties,
which would likely not happen in the absence of the security provided by
contract law. Courts in most developed countries provide protection for
finalized contracts; however, different legal systems provide varying
protections for parties in earlier stages of contract formation, thereby
creating distinct legal environments for the promotion of business
development.
The best way to avoid liability and uncertainty in conducting crossjurisdictional commercial transactions is to have experienced legal counsel
guiding the process. However, high costs and a belief that lawyers may
hinder the entrepreneurial drive of a newer firm has led some firms to
engage in some of their cross-border work sans legal counsel,16 despite the
array of business advice against that approach.17 Even with the assistance
of counsel, working across legal jurisdictions often requires consultation
with foreign experts who understand the unique elements of their own
legal system.18 This places foreign investors without appropriate counsel
in a precarious position.
In this paper, I will examine pre-contractual liability in common law
and civil law systems as a marker of institutional efficiency and business
opportunity. I will build upon North’s institutional analysis theory by
showing how transaction costs are higher in civil law systems that impose
16
Cliff Ennico, How to Hire an Attorney, ENTREPRENEUR, 2015 (“Most small businesses
put off hiring a lawyer until the sheriff is standing at the door serving them with a
summons.”).
17
See, e.g., Michael Acosta, Why Your New Business Needs a Lawyer Yesterday,
ENTREPRENEUR, May 23, 2014; see also Padraig Walsh, How to Know if Your Startup
(Oct.
21,
2016,
2:20
AM),
Needs
a
Lawyer,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/walshpadraig/2016/10/21/when-do-startups-needlawyers/#7e805bad447b; Daniel Doktori and Sarah Reed, Why Lawyers Make Good EarlyStage Startup Hires, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/05/whylawyers-make-good-early-stage-startup-hires.
18
See, e.g., Ettore A. Santucci, How Can U.S. and Non-U.S. Lawyers Work Together to
Improve Opinion Practice in Cross-Border Transactions?, BUS. L. TODAY (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://businesslawtoday.org/2017/01/how-can-u-s-and-non-u-s-lawyers-work-togetherto-improve-opinion-practice-in-cross-border-transactions/ (explaining the difficulties
faced by businesspeople that rely on their local counsel while attempting to work in foreign
jurisdictions).
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liability prior to the conclusion of a contract than in common law systems
that do not. I will also build upon La Porta’s theory by showing how parties
can avoid the trap of inefficient contract institutions through effective legal
counsel,19 to understand how firms change their behavior on the basis of
the presence or absence of effective institutions, and how this promotes
the environment necessary for effective business development.20
This article begins by explaining the importance of understanding the
risks of pre-contractual liability in cross-jurisdictional investments,
highlighting the gap between a potential investor’s “gentlemen’s
agreement” and a valid legal commitment. It moves on to compare legal
traditions with respect to their treatment of pre-contractual acts with a
short history of the development of contract rules in each tradition. It then
identifies four perceived risks of pre-contractual liability that differ
between these legal traditions. Finally, I attempt to show a quantifiable
link between legal tradition and investment climate through a quantitative
and qualitative analysis.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM
A. Nature of the Problem
The central question in this analysis is whether a country’s legal
tradition—that is, common or civil law—affects entrepreneurial activity
in that country. Liability for assertions made during the contract
negotiation process differ amongst common and civil law jurisdictions,
affecting levels of risk for negotiating parties. For purposes of this
analysis, I define negotiation risk as entering into negotiations for a
potential contract at arms-length with one or more parties without any
certainty about the outcome of those negotiations.
It is commonly understood that once two parties have formalized a
contract, either through signatures or some related closing process (e.g.,
notarization), the parties take on a duty to perform, which in layman’s
terms refers to an obligation to abide by the commitments made in the
agreement. Failure to comply with the terms of the agreement may lead to
liability by the non-compliant or breaching party, which in turn may mean
19

La Porta, et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J. OF L, ECON., AND ORG. 222, 251–52
(1999) (explaining that French civil law countries have less efficient and more
interventionist policies toward contracts than German or common law systems); Daron
Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. OF POL ECON. 949, 954
(2005) (arguing that contracting institutions affect investors but not necessarily the overall
investment climate since investors have alternatives available).
20
See generally Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Social Structure and Organizations, in
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS 142 (James G. March ed., 1965).
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litigation or arbitration to resolve the dispute. The duty is what establishes
legal liability for a party to a contract.21
Before that duty arises, however, there is a period in which the parties
go through negotiation—sometimes simple, sometimes quite extensive
and extending over many years.22 Agreements reached during this
preliminary phase—often known as “gentleman’s agreements”23—may
give confidence to the parties that a legally binding commitment has been
made. Indeed, in many cases, these early agreements result in the
establishment of a formal contract that binds the parties. In many other
cases, however, one or both of the parties will decide that a contract is not
appropriate and will terminate negotiations. From the perspective of the
common law, the outcome of the negotiations is immaterial—liability will
only attach under contract law if a contract is in fact concluded.24 This may
not be the case under civil law rules.
It is important to note that during this pre-contractual period, parties
may enter into other preliminary agreements. These can include nondisclosure agreements (NDA),25 confidentiality agreements,26 and letters
of intent, for instance. The NDA and confidentiality agreements are meant
to create an independent contract giving rise to a cause of action for
activities external to the contract itself. The letter of intent,27 however,
speaks to the good faith negotiation of the contract. The latter is treated by
courts almost without exception as a non-binding agreement to agree and

21

See Lamoureux v. Burrillville Racing Ass’n, 161 A.2d 213 (1960).
See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Pre-contractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 221–23
(1987) (explaining the freedom of negotiation approach taken in U.S. contract negotiation
processes).
23
F. Willem Grosheide, The Gentleman’s Agreement in Legal Theory and Modern
Practice 109, 113 (unpublished manuscript) (explaining that these agreements are made in
the “shadow of the law” and that, though not often binding, may be used for interpretation
of other commitments made between the parties), https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream
/handle/1874/42822/b6.pdf.
24
Farnsworth, supra note 22, at 242–43 (discussing the approach of U.S. courts as
aleatory and disinterested in the negotiation itself).
25
See, e.g., Neva B. Jeffries, Preliminary Negotiations or Binding Obligations? A
Framework for Determining the Intent of the Parties, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 8 (2012)
(explaining that an NDA is a binding agreement that is often utilized during contract
negotiations in which disclosure of information about the negotiation itself could hinder
the successful conclusion of a contract).
26
See, e.g., Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in
Complex Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1410–11 (2016) (discussing
the common use of confidentiality agreements in corporate takeover bids to prevent
discussion of the existence of a negotiation or offer).
27
Also known as a “commitment letter,” “memorandum of understanding,” or “term
sheet.”
22
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carries with it no legal remedy in the absence of bad faith.28 The former
agreements carry with them remedies but not for breach of the principal
contract. For the purpose of this discussion, I limit my analysis to liability
for the underlying contract only.
During this negotiation period, a party may take certain steps in
anticipation of the conclusion of a contract with their counterparty. For
instance, a party may secure financing from a lending institution, hire
additional labor, or terminate negotiations with other potential partners.
While none of these actions are mandated by the other party, they are a
natural outgrowth of the negotiation. Each of these actions require a
commitment of resources that would not have been expended but for the
expectation of a contract at the end of the negotiation period. If the contract
does not materialize, who should bear responsibility for covering the
losses associated with the expenditure of these resources? To a common
law lawyer, the answer may seem obvious—these are sunk costs that are
not reimbursable. But to a civil law lawyer, the answer may be quite
different.

PRE-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY DEFINED
It is important at the outset of this discussion to define precisely what
pre-contractual liability means.29 For purposes of our discussion, precontractual liability refers to legal consequences and economic damages
resulting from commitments made by one party during contract
negotiations but before any contract is concluded.30 Cases for precontractual liability can be based upon evidence gathered from documents
exchanged during the negotiations, which may demonstrate party’s intent
toward a particular transaction.31 They express many of the likely
covenants and conditions of the forthcoming contract without actually
agreeing to any of those clauses or conditions. In the eyes of business
professionals, these are binding commitments to negotiate a binding

28

See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 22, at 252 (explaining that “[p]reliminary
agreements, whatever their type, rarely raise questions under the classic rules of offer and
acceptance.”).
29
See id. at 223 (“The law of pre-contractual liability is relatively undeveloped, even on
the grounds that are already recognized. This may be due in part to the considerable
uncertainty that surrounds the measure of recovery under any of these grounds.”).
30
See Grosheide, supra note 23, at 104 (defining pre-contractual agreements as any
agreements “that tend to pave the way to an actual contract”).
31
See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Pre-Contractual Liability and
Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 662 (2007).
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contract. In the eyes of legal professionals, they are dangerously
ambiguous commitments that may or may not be enforceable in court.32
Pre-contractual liability in common law systems is a curious thing. A
contract by common law definition is a promise or set of promises that,
when breached, is remediable in a court of law.33 In a few cases, a court
may decide that the parties had agreed to the majority of terms and
intended to be bound by those terms even though a formal contract was
not concluded.34 In many others, only an agreement to agree was created,
resulting in no liability for failure to go forward with a contract. Yet the
line between the two is highly uncertain and perhaps nonexistent. In
referring to letters of intent, the key pre-contractual document, the great E.
Allan Farnsworth once quipped that “[i]t would be difficult to find a less
predictable area of contract law.” 35
As a general matter, common law offers no recovery of resources
spent on a failed contract negotiation. But if the loss results from a
completed contract negotiation, that party will be able to pursue the
standard contract breach remedy—expectation damages. The area in
between a failed negotiation and a completed contract is a minefield for
contract lawyers in common law courts. In an excellent article outlining
the range of options for remedies in this gray area, Professors Alan
Schwartz and Robert E. Scott explain that there are three potential
outcomes of an incomplete negotiation: 1) if the negotiation never led to
an agreement on material terms, no remedy is available; 2) if the
negotiation led to agreement on all material terms and the parties intended
to memorialize the agreement in the near future, a court will treat that as a
contract and award expectation damages in the event of breach; or, 3) if
the negotiation led to most terms being agreed upon but some left open for
negotiation, the parties are required to negotiate in good faith but are not
eligible for expectation damages yet; however, if a party negotiated in bad
faith, they may be liable for reliance damages.36
In contrast, civil law jurisdictions provide much more clarity and
protection for victims of pre-contractual negotiation “breaches” by
32

J. Andrew Holten, Letters of Intent in Corporate Negotiations: Using Hostage
Exchanges and Legal Uncertainty to Promote Compliance, 162 U. PENN L. REV. 1237,
1247 (2014).
33
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
34
See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 788–89 (Tex. App. 1st 1987)
(concluding that even an informal agreement can become binding if intent is shown, and
explaining that whether the parties have agreed upon all “essential terms of [an] alleged
contract” is one of the factors used to “determine whether the parties intended to be bound
only by a formal, signed writing”).
35
Farnsworth, supra note 22, at 259–60.
36
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 661, 664–65 (2007).
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establishing predictable, statutory remedies. The French civil code defines
a contract as “an agreement by which one or several persons bind
themselves, towards one or several others, to transfer, to do or not to do
something.”37 Note the lack of reference to agreements remediable in court
only. In addition to the basic duty of negotiating in good faith, which is
applied in both common law and civil law jurisdictions, several doctrines
in civil law provide explicit remedies for parties aggrieved by negotiations
that did not result in reasonable outcomes. These remedies are built into
the body of civil law that I will explain below.
The question this article explores is whether foreign investors face
increased legal risk in cross-border transactions in either civil or common
law systems, and whether this may deter investment. This requires asking
whether there are any significant distinctions between common and civil
law contract laws that would generate additional risk for potential
investors; if so, whether those risks affect the overall investment climate;
and how those risks can be mitigated. The next section explains the
methodology used to conduct this mixed methods analysis.

PRE-CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
According to the fictionalized version of the story, in 1961,
entrepreneur Ray Kroc famously shook the hand of Dick McDonald after
agreeing to pay McDonald and his brother $2.7 million as an ownership
buyout and agreeing to give a percentage of future profits in the
McDonald’s franchise. The lump sum was paid, but the recurring profit
checks were never provided despite the enormous success of the
enterprise. Essentially, the original founders of the McDonald’s restaurant
were written out of history with a single payment by Ray Kroc and a
handshake.38 McDonald’s revenues were near $6 billion in 2017.39
Handshakes and similar gestures are commonplace in the business
community. Deals are often made away from the comforts of an attorney’s
office, where a proper contract might be drawn-up. And in many cases, the
handshake is followed-up with a formal contract or the performance of the
agreement, both of which provide the legal authority to enforce the terms
of the contract in court or arbitration. However, as any lawyer will tell his
or her client, the gesture alone is not enough to create an actionable
agreement.
37

CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1101 (Fr.).
See David Brancaccio, The True Origin Story Behind McDonald’s, MARKETPLACE
(Feb. 9, 2017, 6:07 AM), https://www.marketplace.org/2017/02/09/business/ray-krocmcdonalds-fast-food.
39
See, e.g., McDonald’s Serves Up Surging Sales and Profits, BBC NEWS (Oct. 24,
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-41728541.
38
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[O]ne has to bear in mind that commercial men do not
look at these things quite from the lawyer’s point of
view . . . .[Although a lawyer would consider an
instrument to be worthless] a commercial man would
regard the guarantee, perhaps furnished in the form of [a]
letter, as having some value as underlining, as it were, the
promise that had been undertaken.40
In a famous English common law case, a U.S. distributor of carbon
paper products, which were manufactured by an English firm, signed a
document stating the following:41
This arrangement is not entered into, nor is this
memorandum written, as a formal or legal agreement and
shall not be subject to legal jurisdiction in the Law
Courts . . . but it is only a definite expression and record
of the purpose and intention of the three parties
concerned, to which they each honourably pledge
themselves with the fullest confidence—based upon past
business with each other—that it will be carried through
by each of the three parties with mutual loyalty and
friendly co-operation.42
The English company (Crompton) terminated the agreement without
notice and refused to execute orders placed prior to termination. The
American plaintiffs brought suit for breach of contract and non-delivery
of goods. The English court found no binding contract on the basis of the
language above. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Atkin provided useful
language as to why such language would not be binding:
To create a contract there must be a common intention of
the parties to enter into legal obligations, mutually
communicated expressly or impliedly. Such an intention
ordinarily will be inferred when parties enter into an
agreement which in other respects conforms to the rules
of law as to the formation of contracts.43
40
Larry A. DiMatteo, The CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability: Unintended
Contractual Liability in International Business Dealings, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 111, 116
(1997).
41
Rose and Frank Co. v. J.R. Crompton & Bros. Ltd. [1924] UKLH 2, [1925] AC 445
(HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
42
Id.
43
Rose and Frank Co. v. J.R. Crompton & Bros. Ltd. [1923] 2 L. Rep. Incorporated
Council L. Rep., KBD 261, [293] (appeal taken from Eng.).
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The judge went on to explain that language suggesting the desire to
formalize in the future the terms agreed to preliminarily also would negate
the enforceability of those preliminary terms:
I might add that a common instance of effect being given
in law to the express intention of the parties not to be
bound in law is to be found in cases where parties agree
to all the necessary terms of an agreement for purchase
and sale, but subject to a contract being drawn up. The
words of the preliminary agreement in other respects may
be apt and sufficient to constitute an open contract, but if
the parties in so agreeing make it plain that they do not
intend to be bound except by some subsequent document,
they remain unbound though no further negotiation be
contemplated. Either side is free to abandon the
agreement and to refuse to assent to any legal obligation;
when the parties are bound they are bound by virtue only
of the subsequent document.44
Other cases have similarly held that language of non-enforceability
generally negates even formally-drafted language in an agreement.45 The
value of any preliminary promise or assurance is based largely upon its
degree of detail: The detail and strength of the language is positively
correlated with reliance from the other party.
One form of assurance commonly used in business practice is the
comfort letter. “An estimated ninety-five percent of all comfort letters are
issued by a parent company to obtain financing for a subsidiary.” Consider
the case of Chemco Leasing S.p.A. v. Rediffusion Pic., in which Justice
Staughton described comfort letters as a “gentlemen’s agreement”
whereby the business parties are interested in concluding the agreement
even though certain particularities have not yet been ironed out.46 That
manifest intent was sufficient to prove the existence of a binding contract.
In that case, Chemco financed a lease for an electronics manufacturer
partly on the basis of a comfort letter issued by a company (CMC) that
owned 99.1% of that manufacturer’s shares and stating that those shares
would not be sold without prior notice to Chemco. Those shares were
ultimately sold and Chemco later objected to the new shareholders. In
finding that the comfort letter was actionable, Judge Stanghton stated:
44

Id. at 293–94.
See Stanich v. Hissong Grp., Inc., No. 2:09-cv-0143, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98709
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2010) (holding an arbitration agreement, which did not require the
employer to provide advance notice of modification was unenforceable, because it
constituted an illusory promise and lacked mutuality of obligation).
46
DiMatteo, supra note 40, at 115.
45
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When two businessmen wish to conclude a bargain but
find that on some particular aspect of it they cannot
agree, . . . it is not uncommon for them to adopt language
of deliberate equivocation, so that the contract may be
signed and their main objective achieved. No doubt they
console themselves with the thought that all will go well,
and that the terms in question will never come into
operation or encounter scrutiny; but if all does not go well,
it will be for the courts or arbitrators to decide what those
terms mean. In such a case it is more than somewhat
artificial for a judge to go through the process, prescribed
by law, of ascertaining the common intention of the
parties from the terms of the document and the
surrounding circumstances; the common intention was in
reality that the terms should mean what a judge or
arbitrator should decide that they mean, subject always to
the views of any higher tribunal.47
As a general matter, comfort letters and similar preliminary statements
made by a party during a contract negotiation are not enforceable in
common law jurisdictions.48 However, as the Chemco case above
demonstrates, there are exceptions to this rule, such as in the case where a
promise is made and relied upon by the other party to their detriment. This
is similar to the doctrine of contra proferentum, in which any ambiguity
in a document is interpreted against the draftsman.49 In this case, the
promises are interpreted against the party that made them.
While the common law system requires commercial agreements to
meet certain standards in order to constitute enforceable promises, some
civil law systems apply a default rule: a commercial agreement is binding
if it contains language that an objective person would consider to be a
promise.50 A French scholar describes comfort letters as obligations de
faire, meaning a commitment to perform.51 In common law, much more
importance is placed upon the precise words used than on the objective
interpretation of the language.
47

Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Malaysia Mining Corp. Berhad [1988] 1 Lloyd’s L. Rep.
556 (QB) [560-61] (Eng.).
48
See DiMatteo, supra note 40, at 117 (explaining that the Queen’s Bench in England
has previously held that an unsigned comfort letter does not satisfy the statute of frauds,
and thus, is unenforceable).
49
See SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1161 (1st ed. 1920).
50
See Léon Proscour, France, 6 INT’L BUS. LAW. 302 (1978) (explaining under French
law letters of responsibility are considered binding “because in the commercial world the
creation of a meaningless instrument or document is unthinkable”).
51
Id.
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The difference between “we agree” and “we pledge” can
mean the difference between a binding and a non-binding
promise in common law. U.S. courts have tended to place
great weight upon the use or nonuse of contractual
nomenclature. If a comfort letter issuer avoids the
operative words of contract or guaranty, then she will
probably avoid contractual liability. However, the use of
operative phrases such as ‘we agree,’ ‘we undertake,’ or
‘we promise’ generally will lead U.S. courts to find
contractual intent.52
Take for instance the case of Mutual Export Corp. v. Westpac Banking
Corp., in which a bank that was unable to finalize its letter of credit in time
for the closing of a deal issued a letter, which stated as follows:
The Bank has approved at the request of Refrigerated
Express Lines (A/Asia) Pty Ltd, the establishment of an
Irrevocable Credit for USD $500,000 in favour of Mutual
Export Corporation.
The Bank hereby undertakes to issue the credit in
the draft form provided by your company, or as mutually
agreed upon between your company and the Bank.53
Following the demise of the agreement two years later, the plaintiff
attempted to draw down on the letter of credit and found that it was unable
to do so due to an incorrectly notated date in that letter.54 They brought
suit and the defendant bank argued that the language above made the letter
unenforceable.
Applying Australian contract law, the New York court emphasized
that the language used in the letter stipulating that the bank undertakes its
obligation to issue the letter of credit, “while not thus mystically
transforming it into a contract, nevertheless reinforces our concluding that
a contract was intended.”55 They dismissed the bank’s argument that the
letter was not a formal document; however, the court emphasized that the
parties all agreed “that the letter of credit was in place right up until [the]
plaintiff attempted to draw on it.”56 The words used documents indicating
intent significantly impact the ultimate interpretation by the court.
52

DiMatteo, supra note 40, at 118 (footnote omitted).
Mut. Exp. Corp. v. Westpac Banking Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
54
Id. at 1284.
55
Id. at 1286.
56
Id. at 1288.
53
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REFRESHER ON CIVIL AND COMMON LAW CONTRACT RULES
First and foremost, as this is a comparative legal analysis article, it is
important to distinguish between contractual liability in general across
common and civil law jurisdictions. As a reminder, common law
jurisdictions include those countries that, usually due to past colonization,
follow the principles of British common law. This legal tradition
emphasizes judicial interpretation of individual cases above legislative
directives. Civil law jurisdictions constitute most of the remaining
systems.57 These countries follow some form of code-based law (usually
French or German) and derive judicial decisions through application of a
broad array of legislative directives.
In another publication, I explained civil and common law contracts
share many common elements.58 In both systems, an effective contract
requires a valid offer, acceptance, and mutual agreement on the nature of
the contract. However, there are important differences between contracts
in these systems as well, such as the requirement for consideration in
common law contracts and the formalities required for many contracts
within civil law jurisdictions.59 60 These differences can result in disputes
for cross-border transactions as parties may be unaware of the distinct
requirements for contract formation and thus unprepared for resulting
litigation over the effect of their terms.61
For the purposes of this article, my examination will focus on
differences in interpretation and effect across civil and common law
traditions related to a court’s willingness to impose liability for party
actions taken prior to closing a deal. More precisely, whether legal
traditions treat the negotiation process differently with respect to attaching
liability to a party’s statements and, if so, what impact does this have on
the entrepreneurial environment in that jurisdiction. The analysis begins
with clarifying the nature and importance of the problem.

B. Distinctions between Legal Traditions
Common and civil law are two branches of the same tree. However,
their differences with respect to commercial law are significant.62 Civil
law emerged in continental Europe out of the precepts of Roman Law and,
in particular, the Justinian Code. Civil law itself, which was established as
57
Note that there are a number of theocratic countries throughout the Middle East and
Africa, as well as mixed systems of law in countries such as South Africa.
58
See Kevin J. Fandl, Cross-border Commercial Contracts and the Ongoing Need for
Consideration, 34 BERK. J. OF INT’L L. 1 (2015).
59
Id. at 9–18.
60
Id. at 22.
61
Id. at 6, 53.
62
Id. at 6.
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the law of the people, was shaped around the establishment of written
principles meant to guide the actions of the governed as well as the
government. The most far-reaching and comprehensive code established
on the continent in this vein was the Napoleonic Code, which emerged in
1804.63 That Code served as the basis for many other European Codes,
both on the continent and among the former European colonies.64
Common law also has its roots in Roman law.65 However, England,
where common law emerged, chose not to follow the continental model of
establishing written codes to guide practice.66 Rather, England followed a
model that empowered magistrates to make determinations on a case-bycase basis, with the understanding that many of those decisions would
establish a body of precedent to bind judges in similar cases in the future.67
This model was far more adaptable and responsive to issues of the day
than was civil law, which required the work of legislators to change the
law.

1. Common Law: A Short History
Common law is rooted in the concept of freedom of contract.68 Parties
are free to enter into contracts for any legal purpose that suits them, and
courts loath to involve themselves in those private transactions. In an 1890
case in the California Supreme Court, Judge Paterson said, “the greatest
liberty of making contracts is essential to the business interests of the
country. In general, the parties must look out for themselves.”69
Common law was established in England following the Norman
Conquest of 1066, though some elements of what we today associate with
63
For an interesting explanation of the value of the Code in civil law, see Guy Canivet,
French Civil Law Between Past and Revival, 51 LOY. L. REV. 39 (2005).
64
Kensie Kim, Mixed Systems in Legal Origins Analysis, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 693, 718
(2010) (asserting that most civil law countries were modeled on the Napoleonic Code, with
the notable exception of countries of Roman-Dutch origin).
65
See generally T.F.T. Plucknett, The Relations Between Roman Law and English
Common Law down to the Sixteenth Century: A General Survey, 3 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 24
(1939).
66
See Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World,
25 YALE J. INT’L L. 435, 471 (2000).
67
See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale,
103 YALE L.J. 1651 (1994).
68
See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A
Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551, 1621 (2003) (contending that the flexibility
on common law contracts encouraged economic efficiency and more freedom to contract
among parties); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private
Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (2000)
(debating the role of the judiciary in protecting or preventing freedom in the contracting
process).
69
Colton v. Stanford, 82 Cal. 351, 398 (1890).
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common law existed prior to this time.70 Magistrates traveled around
circuits throughout England to hold court and they carried the decisions of
other courts with them. Decisions that were considered local or customary
were largely ignored, but those that appeared “common” among different
jurisdictions were said to establish precedent and were applied in
subsequent cases.
King Henry II officially institutionalized the concept of common law
in 1154.71 He sent judges from the King’s Court to hear disputes around
the country, and they would reconvene to share decisions and establish a
written record of those decisions. Eventually, the prior system of allowing
local laws and customs to govern local disputes fell away, and a national
system of stare decisis was created.
One of the most useful facets of the common law, with respect to
business, is its adaptability. Unlike civil law, which is constrained by the
will of the legislature and the ability of legislators to quickly react to
practical events, the common law need only take a single instance of
perceived injustice to a court to secure a decision that will have an
immediate impact on practice. Justice Brandeis famously quipped, “in
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled
than that it be settled right.”72 Forming a contract in a common law
jurisdiction requires the satisfaction of certain elements. However, in
contrast to civil law jurisdictions (discussed below), common law courts
are more willing to find a contract in the absence of certain formalities.
“The common law, as commonly understood, is notoriously
ineffective in protecting those who rely to their detriment in anticipation
of a contract which fails to materialize.”73 Consider the famous common
law case of Embry v. McKittrick Dry Goods Company.74 There, an
employee who had been with the company for some years reached the end
of his employment contract period. He approached the owner of the
company and asked whether he should look for other work or stay on under
70

See, e.g., JOHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW: LAW AND
SOCIETY IN ENGLAND FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA 20–21 (1996); see
also JOHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW: LAW AND SOCIETY IN
ENGLAND FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA 20–21 (1996); R.C. VAN
CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 33 (2d ed. 1988).
71
See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 457 (1983); PAUL BRAND, “Multis Vigiliis Excogitatam et
Inventam”: Henry II and the Creation of the English Common Law, in THE MAKING OF
THE COMMON LAW 77, 78 (1992).
72
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
73
Ben McFarlane, The Problem of Pre-contractual Reliance: Three Ways to a Third
Way 2 (Oct. 11, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with New York School of Law).
74
Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777 (1907).
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a new contract. The owner, who apparently was too busy at the time to be
bothered with formalities, told Embry: “Go ahead, you’re all right. Get
your men out, and don’t let that worry you.” Embry continued working
without a formal contract. Three months later, he was discharged, and he
brought suit. The court concluded that a contract exists when there is an
expressed manifestation of intent to be bound by a contract: “The inner
intention of parties to a conversation subsequently alleged to create a
contract cannot either make a contract of what transpired, or prevent one
from arising, if the words used were sufficient to constitute a contract.”75
The outward expression of party intent is generally what creates
liability for contract in common law jurisdictions.76 However, common
law courts are willing to find contractual liability, not necessarily precontractual liability, for statements or actions taken prior to the
confirmatory language. Much of the distinction between these two devices
relates to the common law court’s role in the enforcement of promises.
As noted above, freedom of contract is at the heart of common law
contracts. The laissez-faire approach to economic policy introduced in the
late-18th century spilled over into the field of contract law, leaving
government and the regulatory system largely out of private contract
matters.77 Beginning with early U.S. cases, such as Seixas v. Woods in
1804,78 U.S. courts have defaulted to a rule of caveat emptor (“buyer
beware”) in contract transactions, though this trend is changing.79 In the
Seixas case, a buyer was guaranteed a certain type of wood in a contract,
but he failed to conduct an inspection of that wood at the time of the
exchange.80 Later, after realizing that he was given the incorrect type of

75

Id. at 779.
See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E. 2d 516 (1954); see also Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City
Bank of New York, 200 Fed. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). see also, Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.,
729 S.W.2d 768, 788-89 (1987), in which the court found that:
Several factors have been articulated to help determine whether the parties intended to be
bound only by a formal, signed writing: (1) whether a party expressly reserved the right to
be bound only when a written agreement is signed; (2) whether there was any partial
performance by one party that the party disclaiming the contract accepted; (3) whether all
essential terms of the alleged contract had been agreed upon; and (4) whether the
complexity or magnitude of the transaction was such that a formal, executed writing would
normally be expected . . .
77
See Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Individual
Parties: The Tug of War Continues, 77 UMKC L. REV. 647, 652 (2009) (explaining that
courts in the early 19th century sought to preserve market growth by protecting freedom of
contract).
78
Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. R. 48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
79
See Nicole W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Pre-Contractual
Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70 (1993) (arguing that courts are increasingly
looking to principles of good faith and reliance in commercial contracts).
80
Seixas, 2 Cai. R. at 54.
76
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wood, he sued, but the court refused to assist him and placed the burden
on the parties to contract to ensure compliance with the terms of the deal.81
Undoubtedly, the concept of caveat emptor has significantly evolved
in the American common law system.82 Today, many types of contracts
require parties to disclose certain information during a negotiation
regardless of whether the other party requests it.83 These situations include
when a party negligently misrepresents a material fact during a contract
negotiation;84 dangerous conditions not discoverable by a buyer in a
property transaction;85 or where a party with knowledge is aware that a
buyer has false information to a transaction and the seller takes no steps to
correct the mistake.86 However, in the absence of an agreement to disclose
and these narrow areas of law, most other contractual transactions bear no
duty of candor in common law contracts, leaving the parties largely on
their own to conduct their due diligence.87
During the contract negotiation process in common law, the parties
are most often treated as uncommitted and at-risk for any loss that might
occur from failure to conclude a contract.88 “Common law judges have
always taken what I have called an aleatory view of negotiations; a party
that enters negotiations hoping to gain from a resulting contract bears the
risk of any loss that would be incurred if the other party breaks off the
negotiations.”89 Outside the case of estoppel or misrepresentation, a
common law “party to pre-contractual negotiations, may break off the
81

See Colton v. Stanford, 82 Cal. 351, 398 (1890) (“[T]he greatest liberty of making
contracts is essential to the business interests of the country. In general, the parties must
look out for themselves.”); Swinton v. Whitinsville Sav. Bank, 42 N.E. 2d 808 (1942) (“A
vendor of real property has no duty to disclose to a prospective purchaser the fact of a latent
termite condition in the premises.”). But see, Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1983)
(limiting the doctrine of caveat emptor in certain real property transactions in California).
82
See Howard Johnson, Caveat Venditor (Let the Seller Beware), 27 MANAGERIAL L. 1,
2–3 (1985) (explaining the shift toward consumer protection taking place in the mid-20th
century).
83
See Palmieri, supra note 79.
84
See Asleson v. West Branch Land Co., 311 N.W.2d 533, 535 (N.D. 1981)
85
State v. Brooks, 658 A.2d 22, 24–26 (Vt. 1995) (finding a seller liable where he failed
to disclose a defect in the property that he was aware was dangerous and that ultimately
killed the buyer).
86
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
87
See William B. Goldfarb, Fraud and Nondisclosure in the Vendor-Purchaser
Relation, 8 WEST. RES. L. REV. 5, 13 (1956); W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 106, at 737 (5th ed. 1984).
88
See Juliet P. Kostirtsky, Uncertainty, Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations and the
Holdup Problem, 61 SMU L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2008) (explaining the problem of
uncertainty in contract negotiation).
89
E. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under the UNIDROIT
Principles, Relevant International Conventions, and National Laws, 3 TUL. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 47, 57 (1995).
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negotiations at any time and for any reason, including no reason at all, and
face no liability.”90 This is not the case in civil law jurisdictions.

2. Civil Law: A Short History
Though there are many variations of civil law, this section will focus
on the most widespread, which is the Napoleonic Code.91 Book III of the
Napoleonic Code addresses the law of commercial obligations, which will
be the focus of this analysis.92
Civil law is based upon the theory that the state should have a key role
to play in the administration of justice and the determination of appropriate
public policy. Legislators decide what the law should be, and government
administrators (regulators) apply the law.93 Though far less adaptable than
the common law, civil law boasts a great deal of predictability and
transparency.94 The law is not decided through interpretation in the courts
after it is enacted—it is decided in advance by the legislature.
Predictability is no doubt a good feature for commercial transactions.95
Knowing what the law is can lend clarity to a transaction that might be rife
with business risk. Civil law, in this sense, can help mitigate some
transactional risk by eliminating the third-party interpretation associated
with the courts in common law jurisdictions. However, predictability
comes with potential risk for parties that prefer to consider multiple
options for their contractual endeavors before settling on a final choice. As
we will see below, civil law is less forgiving of parties that make promises
without following through on them.
French law has similar contract formation requirements to those of
common law jurisdictions.96 Clear and certain intent to be bound by the
90
R.J.P. Kottenhagen, From Freedom of Contract to Forcing Parties to Agreement: On
the Consequences of Breaking off Negotiations in Different Legal Systems, 12 IUS
GENTIUM, J. OF THE U. OF BALT. CTR. FOR INT’L AND COMP. L. 58, 73 (2006).
91
Two key variations of the civil law are the Germanic Code and the Scandinavian
Code; however, differences between common and civil law are far more substantial than
differences among the variations of civil law.
92
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. (Fr.).
93
See Max Rheinstein, Common Law and Civil Law: An Elementary Comparison, 22
REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA U. DE PUERTO RICO 90 (1952).
94
See Ken Adams, Civil-Law Drafting Compared to Common-Law Drafting (Nov. 24,
2006), http://www.adamsdrafting.com/civil-law-and-common-law-drafting/ (defining
civil law as more predictable given the number of statutes on contracts).
95
See, e.g., Stefanie A. Lindquist and Frank C. Cross, Stability, Predictability and the
Rule of Law: Stare Decisis as a Reciprocity Norm, U. TEXAS WORKING PAPER,
https://law.utexas.edu/conferences/measuring/The%20Papers/Rule%20of%20Law%20Co
nference.crosslindquist.pdf. But see, Ofer Raban, The Fallacy of Legal Certainty: Why
Vague Legal Standards may be Better for Capitalism and Liberalism, 19 PUB. INTEREST L.
J. 175 (2010).
96
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1112-1 (Fr.).
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parties’ stated terms as well as stipulation of essential contract terms are
required to form a valid contract.97 A significant difference exists between
the two systems with respect to the need for consideration.98 In civil law,
the contract formation process is clear and defined, with certain elements,
depending on the type of contract, required by law. These formalities make
the line between a potential contract and an actual contract relatively thin.
As noted in the previous section, in the common law, the lack of such
formalities led to the need for consideration—valuable exchange—to
prove that the parties meant to actually form a contract.99

PERCEIVED LEGAL RISKS FOR ENTREPRENEURS
Pre-contractual liability exists when a party engaged in the negotiation
of a contract faces monetary or equitable damages for actions that took
place prior to the formation of the contract, regardless of whether the
contract was executed or not. As discussed above, pre-contractual liability
can pose a significant risk to parties that might be interested in
investigating avenues for the successful conclusion of a contract but
ultimately choose to go a different way. The more predictable this risk is,
the less likely it will pose a barrier to the potential negotiation process.100
This section discusses four of the most common areas of legal risk for
pre-contractual acts: lesion, Good Faith, Duty to Disclose and Reliance.
What will become clear from this discussion is that all remedies across
both legal systems are highly limited to specific circumstances; however,
what will also be clear is the variety of mechanisms available in civil law
jurisdictions and the dearth of such options in common law jurisdictions.
We will begin with the doctrine of lesion.

1. Civil Equity: The Doctrine of Lesion
One of the significant distinctions between common law and civil law
is the ability of a common law court to create its own equitable remedies
for a particular case. This practice inserts a great deal of unpredictability
into any commercial transaction and poses a significant legal and financial
97

PAULA GILIKER, PRE-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW 3
(Kluwer Law International, 2002) (“le contrat est une convention par laquelle une ou
plusieurs personnes s’obligent, envers une ou plusieurs autres, à donner, à faire ou à ne pas
faire quelque chose.” (“a contract is a convention which binds one or more persons,
towards another or several others, to give, to do, or not to do something.”))
98
See Fandl, supra note 58, at 11–12 (explaining the lack of a requirement for
consideration in civil law contracts).
99
Fandl, supra note 58 (outlining the history of the need for consideration in common
law contracts).
100
Kostirsky, supra note 88.
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risk to parties. In most instances, civil law commercial transactions avoid
this risk.101 However, there are a few established equitable remedies in
civil law that, while not unpredictable, do provide parties with potentially
unexpected results.
Civil law is more likely to impose liability on parties earlier in the
negotiation process than common law.102 This can mean pre-contractual
documents, such as comfort letters, are used as evidence to bind parties in
the event of a dispute over final contract terms or execution.103 One of the
public policy reasons for this increased willingness to make parties liable
for their pre-contractual assertions is the strong protections that statutes
have historically provided for consumers and parties in less powerful
bargaining positions.104 The doctrine of lesion is one of the most
significant examples of this policy.105
French law favors enforcement. To the French, “the creation [in the
commercial world] of a meaningless instrument is unthinkable.”106 Part of
the reason for the civil law tilt toward enforcing pre-contractual promises
is the judicial examination of party intent. “Article 1156 dictates that the
jurist seek ‘the common intention of the contracting parties rather than stop
at the mere literal sense of language.’”107
Lesion is the civil law concept that originally allowed a party to void
a contract in which they would receive less than half the value of the
property to be transferred to them.108 The goal behind the original concept,
known as lasesio enormis, was to protect landowners from being exploited
by wealthier landowners.109 The concept grew from application to

101

Changes to commercial transaction rules in civil law countries are made by legislation,
not by judicial decree. See, e.g., Changes to French Contract Law are Now in Effect: Are
you Prepared?, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS, https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/~/media/files
/insights/publications/2016/10/changes-to-french-contract-law-are-now-in-effect-are-youprepared/24784changestofrenchcontractlawalert.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2019)
(describing the new French law on contracts, which includes the equitable remedy of
specific performance).
102
DiMatteo, supra note 40, at 126.
103
Id.
104
See Gabriela Gheorgiu, et. al, Consumer Protection in Relation with the European
Business Environment, 11 EUROPEAN SCI. J. 112, 113 (2015) (describing the European
consumer protection environment as necessary to insulate consumers from bad acts of
businesses).
105
See LA Civ. Code 2663 (2010).
106
DiMatteo, supra note 40, at 124.
107
Id. at 125.
108
Saúl Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress, and an Epilogue on Lesion,
50 LA L. REV. 1, 6 (1989).
109
Christopher K. Odinet, Commerce, Commonality, and Contract Law: Legal Reform
in a Mixed Jurisdiction, 75 LA. L. REV. 741, 777 (2015).
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immovable property to movable property during early European times as
a concept of “commutative justice.”110
Originating in the Middle Ages, the notion of inequality
of consideration is now codified in article 1647 of the
French Civil Code: ‘If the price of an immovable object
is inadequate by more than seven-twelfths, the seller has
the right to demand rescission of the sale.’ This is true
even if the seller had renounced her right to rescission in
writing. The right of rescission gives the purchaser two
options: to return the item or to pay ‘the balance of the
just price.’ Unlike the just price theories of the Middle
Ages, the purchaser does not have a right of rescission if
she has paid more than one and seven-twelfths the item’s
value. Thus, under European law, a bid or offer letter to
purchase at a below-market price may be subject to
rescission or reformation.111
By the time of Napoleon, great consternation over the expanded lesion
concept had arisen within the business community. Valuing movable
property and thus determining when the amount was less than half of that
value became a subject of dispute.112 When Napoleon issued his Code in
1804, he included the original lesion concept, which allowed a remedy for
a party that received less than half of the value of immovable property
only.113 This is the same concept that applies in most civil law countries
today; however, no such concept exists in common law.114

2. Good Faith
[Good faith is] simply a rechristening of fundamental
principles of contract law.115
Good faith . . . is best understood as an ‘excluder’—it is a
phrase which has no general meaning or meanings of its

110

See Gerald J. Postema, Risks, Wrongs, and Responsibility: Coleman’s Liberal Theory
of Commutative Justice, 103 YALE L. J. 861, 862 (1993) (citing 37 Thomas Aquinas,
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 87–101 (1975); see also Odinet, supra note 109, at 777.
111
DiMatteo, supra note 40, at 112.
112
Odinet, supra note 109, at 777–78.
113
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. (Fr.).
114
However, as a mixed legal system, lesion is applied in Louisiana. See, e.g., Girault v.
Feucht, 120 La. 1070 (1908), Pierce v. Roussel, 227 La. 438 (1955); Harruff v. King, 139
So. 3d 1062 (2014).
115
Tymshare Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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own, but which serves to exclude many heterogeneous
forms of bad faith.116
In both common and civil law, we often discuss the concept of good
faith.117 This phrase gives us comfort that, if a party undermines the
negotiation, we will have some sort of remedy at law. Yet the results of
such cases widely vary depending on whether it is in a common or civil
law jurisdiction.
Good faith is an amorphous concept that has been applied in both civil
and common law jurisdictions to circumstances in which the law is unable
or unwilling to provide a remedy, yet the interest of justice demands one.
It is associated with concepts such as justice, fairness, and honesty in
dealing.118 In the case of pre-contractual liability, good faith can refer to
situations in which parties were held liable for their statements made
during the negotiation process that created expectations by the other party.
It is important to note at the outset of our good faith discussion that a
significant difference exists between good faith in the negotiation process
and good faith in the performance of a contract. The latter is required in
both common and civil law jurisdictions; however, the former is required
only in civil law.119

a.

Good Faith in the Civil Law

The principle of good faith in performance originated in Roman
law.120 This principle was subsequently adopted by the business
community, the lex mercatoria, to facilitate compliance with contractual
promises made between parties.121 Modern civil law codifies the concept
of bona fides (good faith) in their respective codes.122
116

Robert R. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, VA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1968).
117
See Arntz Contracting Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 4th 464,
482 (1996) (“Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing
in its performance and its enforcement.”); Aiton Australia Pty. Ltd. v Transfield Pty. Ltd.
(1999) 153 F.L.R. 236, 258 (“It appears to be commonsense that as an obligation to act in
‘good faith’ may, in principle, be legally recognised as an implied or imputed obligation.”).
118
See Menno van der Veen & Willem K. Korthals Altes, Strategic Urban Projects in
Amsterdam and New York: Incomplete Contracts and Good Faith in Different Legal
Systems, 46 J. OF URB. STUD. 947, 951 (2009).
119
See Gregory J. Marsden & George J. Siedel, The Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith:
Are BATNA Strategies Legal?, 14 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 127, 135 (2017).
120
Max Radin, Fundamental Concepts of the Roman Law, 12 CAL. L. REV. 481, 494
(1924).
121
Richard E. Speidel, The “Duty” of Good Faith in Contract Performance and
Enforcement, 46 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 537 (1996).
122
See, e.g., BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 242 (Ger.); CODE CIVIL
[C. CIV.] art. 1134-35 (Fr.).
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The concept of good faith in civil law is broadly interpreted:
The difference between civil law and common . . . is that
the latter system accepts that good faith is not only the
opposite of bad faith and a principle of honesty; it is also
an independent legal category, which can be used to
create rules. The . . . Dutch good faith principle
encourages parties to consider each other’s interests, even
before a contract is signed.123
The broad civil law interpretation—applying good faith to the
negotiation as well as the performance of contracts—stands in stark
contrast to the narrower and limited common law version, discussed
below.
Pre-contractual liability in civil law can be traced back to Jhering, the
German scholar, in 1865.124 Jhering put together the doctrine of culpa in
contrahendo, or fault in negotiating.125 He contended that there are many
circumstances in German case law in which a party, prior to formation of
a contract, was negatively impacted because of the “blameworthy”
conduct of the other party to the negotiation.126 This blameworthy conduct
included a party enticing another party toward a contract with objective
knowledge of an impossibility to its formation. It also included a buyer
who inadvertently orders 100 widgets rather than the 10 they intended and
would not be liable to reimburse the seller for the transport costs for return
of the excess widgets.127
Jhering was referring to the concept of bad faith in negotiating and
believed that a remedy should exist in civil law to account for this inequity.
Subsequent modifications to the German civil code facilitated a resolution
by imposing the concept of reliance on negotiating parties.128 Following
these modifications to the civil code, parties are able to recover in a
number of pre-contractual cases: when a party is injured upon entering a
store or restaurant; when a party expends resources to visit a house for sale
despite the seller having already sold it (and not disclosing that fact); or a
party with a duty to disclose giving erroneous information.129
123

See Van der Veen & Korthals, supra note 118, at 951.
Jonathan Cardenas, Deal Jumping in Cross-Border Merger & Acquisition
Negotiations: A Comparative Analysis of Pre-Contractual Liability Under French,
German, United Kingdom and United States Law, 963–64 (2013).
125
See Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith,
and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401, 402 (1964).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 402–03.
128
See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], §§ 122, 149, 179, 307, 309,
463, 523 para. 2, 524, 500, 663, 694 (Ger.).
129
Kessler & Fine, supra note 125, at 404–05.
124
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It is important to note that the injured party in these cases is not entitled
to expectation damages, because it would presuppose the existence of a
contract. Rather, the injured party may seek reliance damages amounting
to the extent of their loss resulting from actions taken in reliance on the
promises of the blameworthy party.
The requirement to negotiate a contract in good faith exists throughout
European civil codes. The oldest instance of this requirement is in the
Italian civil code. The commentary to that section of the code stipulates
parties must negotiate, “always bearing in mind the purpose that the
contract is intended to satisfy, the harmony of the interests of the parties,
and the superior interests of the nation requiring productive
cooperation.”130 A recent review of Italian case law applying this principle
of good faith in cases of pre-contractual liability explains how this concept
works in practice:
Italian case law now universally acknowledges that the
notions of good faith and fairness are expressions of the
general principle of social solidarity recognized by the
Italian Constitution, and that they refer to specific
obligations that apply both during contract negotiations
and during the performance of contracts. These
obligations are in addition to any other contractual duty
already binding on the parties; in the event of their
infringement, the aggrieved party is entitled to claim
damages. It is also generally accepted that public policy
imposes the requirement of good faith in all dealings (Art
1175 of the Civil Code) and during the pre-contractual
stage (Art 1337 of the Civil Code).131
Pre-contractual liability in Italy can exist even if a contract is
ultimately concluded between the parties, so long as there is a showing of
breach of good faith during the negotiations. A seminal case on this matter,
from the Italian high court, involved a farmer who applied to the national
utility company for access to electricity for his irrigation system.132 The
utility company took 18 months to begin providing electricity (thereby
executing the contract) and the farmer sued for damages caused by the
delayed service. The Court held that, “the conclusion of the contract does

130

Tommaso Febbrajo, Good Faith and Pre-Contractual Liability in Italy: Recent
Developments in the Interpretation of Article 1337 of the Italian Civil Code, 2 ITALIAN L.
J. 291, 298 n. 17 (2016).
131
Id. at 295.
132
Id. at 299, n. 29 (footnote omitted).
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not render irrelevant the behaviour contrary to good faith during the
formation of a contract.”133
In addition to this principle of Italian law, a second, and potentially
more serious risk, for foreign investors in Italy is the law on
disadvantageous contracts.134 This article of the Italian civil code provides
a remedy for a party who, due to misleading or incorrect information
provided during the contract negotiation, suffers a loss.135 The following
two cases exemplify this principle.
In the first case, an investor purchased shares in a reputable Italian
bank.136 The investor made the purchase because of information found in
the bank’s prospectus. However, that information was misleading, and the
investor ultimately paid more than the fair market value for the shares. The
court concluded that this was a violation of the good faith duty that led to
a disadvantage for the buyer. The buyer was compensated the difference
between the price paid and the market value of the shares.
The second case involved a buyer of an industrial machine.137 During
the contract negotiation, the seller informed the buyer that a government
tax benefit would provide the buyer with a 33% rebate on his purchase.
However, at the time the statement was made, unbeknownst to the seller,
that subsidy expired. No mention of the subsidy appeared in the sales
agreement, and the contract was concluded. When the buyer sued for
compensation, the court again found bad faith and a disadvantageous
contract. The buyer was awarded an amount equivalent to 33% of the
contract price.138
An important lesson from these cases regarding disadvantageous
contracts is that the remedy ultimately integrates the points made precontractually into the final contract:
[T]he remedy for such a specific violation of good faith
makes the pre-contractual information given by one party
to the other legally binding as terms of the agreement: the
party providing information is bound to perform in
accordance with what was said, regardless of his or her
intentions, aims and awareness.139

133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id.
CODICLE CIVILE [C. c.] art. 1337 (It.).
Id.; Febbrajo, supra note 130, at 301.
Febbrajo, supra note 130, at 293 n. 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 303.
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And though no specific remedy for breach of good faith in contract
negotiations has been established by the Italian civil code,140 the fact that
the code specifically creates liability for such breaches should place
foreign investors on notice. The high court in Italy said in 2007 that, “the
extent of pre-contractual liability cannot be precisely predetermined.”141
This is not a comforting assessment.
In their 2009 comparison of Dutch and American real estate contracts,
Van der Veen and Korthals use a famous Dutch case as an example of the
civil law application of good faith.142 In that case, a real estate developer
was in the midst of negotiating a development contract with a community
to build a swimming pool.143 The developer drafted a proposal that was
sent to the community, and they were given assurances that they would be
awarded the contract. However, the community instead chose to use the
developer’s proposal to solicit a bid from a third party, which it ultimately
accepted. The developer sued and, despite the lack of a formal contract,
recovered significant equitable damages, including the costs for preparing
the proposal and expectation damages, a concept familiar to common law
practitioners. “In Dutch law, good faith is used to bridge the gap that the
adversary model of contract law assumes to exist between parties by
stipulating that parties must attend to each other’s interests.”144
The duty to negotiate in good faith, while non-existent in common law
jurisdictions, is frequently applied in civil law jurisdictions, despite a lack
of statutory guidance in many instances.145 Pre-contractual liability for
failure to negotiate in good faith had already been codified in Italy146 and
Germany.147 However, French law is one example in which the statute had
been silent as to the requirement for good faith in contract negotiations,
140

Id. at 304.
Id. at 293, n. 6.
142
See JAMES GORDLEY, THE ENFORCEABILITY OF PROMISES IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT
LAW 135 (Cambridge U. Press) (2001).
143
Id.
144
Van der Veen & Korthals, supra note 118, at 953.
145
See PAULA GILIKER, PRE-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW
(Kluwer Law International, 1st ed. 2002) (describing precontractual liability and good faith
requirements in French law). But see Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required
During Precontractual Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70, 90–91 (1993) (explaining
that the drafters of the UCC considered including a requirement that good faith principles
apply to contract negotiation but chose not to).
146
Arunachalam, Aarti, An Analysis of the Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith:
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreement (2002). LLM Theses and Essays. 22.
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/stu_llm/22. “The negotiating parties must deal with ‘a
sense of probity . . . having always in mind the purpose which the contract is intended to
satisfy, the harmony of the interests of the parties, and the superior interests of the nation
requiring productive cooperation.’” (citing Relazione al codice civile (the Law on the Civil
Code)).
147
Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 307 (Ger.).
141
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then French courts filled that silence with consistent interpretations of the
code that applied good faith requirements to negotiations in French law.148
A 2016 change to the French civil code added a requirement that
parties to a contract negotiation negotiate in good faith.149 The original
French code did not expressly mention good faith in the negotiation of a
contract, only in the performance of that contract.150 However, French
courts generally extended the duty to pre-contractual negotiations as well
as contract performance. The new law codifies this practice by establishing
liability for bad faith in the negotiation process:
Art. 1104. Contracts must be negotiated, formed and
performed in good faith. This provision is a matter of
public policy.
Art. 1112. The commencement, continuation and
breaking-off of pre-contractual negotiations are free from
control. They must mandatorily satisfy the requirements
of good faith.151
The concept of freedom of contract exists in European civil law as
well; however, government intervention, often on behalf of consumers,
has limited the scope of this freedom.152 Similarly,
The Dutch Supreme Court has held that parties must act
in accord with ‘reasonableness and equity’ in negotiating
a contract. As such, each party must take into account the
reasonable interests of the other. In forcing this duty, a
court may order a party to either proceed with or resume
the negotiations or pay damages for breaking off
negotiations. Most surprisingly, damages may be based
on the injured party’s expectation interest. If a contract
was sufficiently close to conclusion, a party’s expectation
interest may include profits that would have been made
had the envisaged contract been performed. No common
law judge could conceive of such a result.153

148

See, e.g., BARRY NICHOLAS, THE FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 48, 71 (2d ed. 1992).
See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1112 (Fr.).
150
See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1134-35 (Fr.).
151
See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1112 (Fr.).
152
Jurgen Basedow, Freedom of Contract in the European Union, 16 EUR. REV. PRIVATE
L. 901 (2008) (explaining that the concept of “freedom of contract” in civil law is
theoretically present in EU and national laws, but consumer protection laws, among others,
limit the application of this doctrine).
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Farnsworth, supra note 89, at 58.
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The good faith principle is at the heart of the precontractual liability
discussion. The point at which liability attaches, and the extent of that
liability, can tremendously alter the risk faced by negotiating parties.
French, Dutch and German law impose liability on parties that break off a
contract negotiation in bad faith. Such damages are similar to reliance
damages in common law courts, which allow for reimbursement of the
reasonable expenditures leading up to the termination.154 However,
damages for breach of good faith in contract negotiations has no equivalent
in common law.155

b.

Good Faith in the Common Law

Contrast that Dutch case with a similar example under common law,
discussed in more detail in the next section, in which the court expressly
rejected the concept of good faith in negotiations as “repugnant” to the
adversarial nature of contract negotiations:
[T]he concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good
faith is inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of
the parties when involved in negotiations. Each party to
the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own
interest,
so
long
as
he
avoids
making
misrepresentations . . . .A duty to negotiate in good faith
is as unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent
with the position of a negotiating party.156
The principle that good faith does not apply to a contract negotiation
in common law is rooted in the belief that parties are free to make and
break commitments prior to the execution of a contract and to pursue
multiple parties in the quest for the best possible outcome. This seemingly
underhanded and shady type of dealing is not necessarily how contracts
are negotiated in commercial practice.157 However, should a party not act
in good faith in the process of negotiation, common law courts would
unlikely impose liability on that party.

154
See Conducting negotiations in France: The sudden breaking off of negotiations (“La
rupture abusive des pourparlers”), Eversheds Paris (Feb. 2015), https://www.evershedssutherland.com/documents/global/france/Conducting_negotiations_in_France_note.pdf
155
Marsden & Siedel, supra note 119, at 135–36 (explaining differing degrees of liability
across civil law jurisdictions and the absence of liability in common law jurisdictions).
156
Walford v. Miles, 1 All ER 453 at 460-1 (1992).
157
See, e.g., Roger Brownswood, Two Concepts of Good Faith, 1994 JCL LEXIS 16
(1994) (explaining that in practice, most commercial entities negotiate in good faith despite
the lack of legal obligation to do so).
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The requirement to perform a contract in good faith has been a staple
concept of the common law for at least 200 years.158 More recently, it has
been codified in the Uniform Commercial Code.159 However, in both case
law and code, it is quite evident that this duty applies to the performance
stage of the contract and not to the negotiation stage.160
The duty of good faith in the common law has its roots in freedom of
contract. Courts are careful to give weight only to what parties chose to
include in their contracts and take few liberties in interpreting beyond the
language of the contract itself. This aligns with the general policy that
parties are free to negotiate any terms they find agreeable, so long as they
do not violate the law.161 There are exceptions to this general policy, such
as public services and utilities, which must be provided to anyone who
requests them without discrimination; however, these exceptions are
limited and do not carry over to most commercial contracts.162
“We have not yet reached the stage, where the selection of a trader’s
customers is made for him by the government.”163 This quote, from a 1915
Court of Appeals decision in New York, reflects the strong protection in
common law courts for the freedom of contract. Shortly after this case, the
Lochner era of regulation began in which courts largely refused
government attempts to intervene, even if the contract disadvantaged
workers.164 And while we saw an increased penchant for common law
courts to intervene in some contract areas—such as labor practices,165
discriminatory practices,166 and environmental protection167—the general
principle of freedom of contract remains as strong as ever.
Accordingly, the common law will not restrict the freedom of parties
to enter into and subsequently withdraw from contract negotiations
without liability.168 This freedom encourages more active engagement in
158

Kirke La Shelle Co., v. Paul Armstrong Co., 88 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 1933); Boone v.
Eyre, 1 H. BI 273, 126 Eng. Rep. 160(a) (K.B. 1777); Kingston v. Preston, 2 Doug. 689,
99 Eng. Rep. 437 (K.B. 1773).
159
See Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter “UCC”] § 1-304.
160
See, e.g., Kessler & Fine, supra note 125, at 408.
161
Id. at 411–12; see also Mark Pettit Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise
and Fall”, 79 B.U. L. REV. 263 (1999).
162
See Peter W. Hanschen, A Public Utility’s Obligation to Serve: Saber or DoubleEdged Sword?, ELECTRICITY J. (2004) (explaining the obligation for utilities in California
to provide service on a non-discriminatory basis).
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The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 FED. REP. 46
(1915); see also, Rome G. Brown, The Right to Refuse to Sell, 25 YALE L. J. 194 (1916).
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Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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See Richard A. Epstein, Regulation—and Contract—in Environmental Law, 93 W.
VA. L. REV. 859 (1991).
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See Pettit, supra note 161.
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potential deal-making and can incentivize parties to take more risks.169
However, the line between a negotiation and a preliminary agreement is
often thin.
Agreement on essential terms of a contract, even in the absence of
definiteness, may be interpreted by both common and civil law courts as a
complete contract. Courts in both jurisdictions are usually willing to fillin the gaps to complete a contract so long as there is clear evidence of the
parties’ intent to be bound by the existing terms.170 171 And while this will
not turn one party’s notion of an agreement into a binding contract in most
cases, minor uncertainties will not prevent a court from refusing
enforcement.172
Similar to other common law jurisdictions, the United States confines
the protection of good faith principles to the performance of the contract.
Section 1-304 of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) (formerly section 1203) stipulates: “Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.”173 The
comment to that section explicitly limits the scope of application for the
doctrine of good faith in U.S. law. It states that the UCC:
does not support an independent cause of action for failure
to perform or enforce in good faith . . . .The doctrine of
good faith merely directs a court towards interpreting
contracts within the commercial context in which they are
created, performed, and enforced, and does not create a
separate duty of fairness and reasonableness which can be
independently breached.174
Similarly, the Restatement of Contracts, which is a compilation of key
principles extracted from common law precedent, establishes a duty of
169

See John M. Czarnetzky, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of the Bankruptcy
Discharge, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393, 399 (2000) (presenting the “entrepreneurial hypothesis”
that bankruptcy discharge and freedom of contract have the combined effect of
encouraging entrepreneurs to act more entrepreneurially).
170
See Cohen & Sons, Inc. v. Lurie Woolen Co., 133 N.E. 370, 371 (N.Y. 1921); United
States v. City of New York, 131 F.2d 909, 914–16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 781
(1942).
171
Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch [ZGB], Code civil [CC], Codice civile [CC] [Civil
Code] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, RS 210, art. 2 (Switz.) (referring to the good faith, or
Vertrauensprinzip, principle in Swiss law); BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL
CODE], § 154 (Ger.) translation at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html. (Ger.) (detailing the German
law principle that a contract is considered enforceable where the parties believe they have
entered into a contract but have failed to agree on a specific point).
172
Cohen & Sons, 133 N.E. at 370–71.
173
UCC § 1-304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
174
Id. at cmt. 1.
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good faith. However, this duty is expressly limited to the performance
period of the contract, thus establishing no pre-contractual liability:
“Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”175 However, the
comments to the Restatement also make abundantly clear that this section,
as is the case with UCC section 1-304, does not apply to the negotiation
phase of the contract:
Good faith in negotiation. This Section, like Uniform
Commercial Code § 1-[304], does not deal with good
faith in the formation of a contract. Bad faith in
negotiation, although not within the scope of this Section,
may be subject to sanctions. Particular forms of bad faith
in bargaining are the subjects of rules as to capacity to
contract, mutual assent and consideration and of rules as
to invalidating causes such as fraud and duress.176
It is important to note, as the comment above suggests, that other
provisions within U.S. law may ultimately apply similar concepts as those
found within the civil law. For instance, UCC Section 2-302, which
provides a remedy for parties subjected to an unconscionable clause within
a contract.177 However, a number of cases show the narrow application of
this clause and its inapplicability to pre-contractual negotiations. 178
Common law courts have been very clear in their refusal to apply good
faith principles to contract negotiations, except for very limited
circumstances,179 or when the parties expressly agree to an obligation to
negotiate in good faith.180 There is no statutory or general case-based
requirement to negotiate contracts in good faith, leaving the parties to
determine if and when to break-off the negotiation.181
175

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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UCC § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
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See Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414, 73
P.2d 1272, 1275–76 (1937) (finding a clause limiting the time within which complaints
about defects can be filed to be unconscionable when it excludes a defect only discoverable
by microscopic analysis).
179
See Browning Jeffries, Preliminary Negotiations or Binding Obligations? A
Framework for Determining the Intent of the Parties, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 13, nn.56–57
(2012) (examining limited exceptions based upon statutes or binding exclusivity clauses).
180
See SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene Inc., 67 A.3d 330, 343–44 (Del. 2013) (“[A]n
express contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith is binding on the contracting
parties”).
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See Robert Coyne and Kevin Evans, Non-binding Preliminary Agreements: Use
“Good Faith” with Caution, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (2008) (“Under English law, there is
no recognition of an implied obligation to negotiate in good faith, and the inclusion of an
express provision does not, in the absence of a binding agreement, limit a party’s ability to
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3. Duty to Disclose/ Misrepresentation
Closely related to the concept of good faith is the duty to disclose
information in a contract negotiation. Both common law and civil law
establish some obligation of the parties to disclose material facts that
would have a substantial impact on the ignorant party’s decision to enter
the contract at all.182 Consider the following case:183
Organ (Buyer) and Girault (Seller) were negotiating over the
commercial sale of tobacco in the United States during the War of 1812
when ports were blocked for trade. While considering the final terms of
the sale, Organ received information from his brother who had been with
the British fleet that the War was over, and the port would be reopened.
Organ did not disclose this information to Girault but instead immediately
accepted the offer and purchased the tobacco. When news broke the next
day, the price of tobacco increased substantially.
Girault sued Organ contending that the latter had a duty to disclose
information that would have had a material effect on their negotiation.
Chief Justice Marshall disagreed and, in a brief opinion, found that Organ
had no duty to disclose.184 Since that case, common law courts have
vacillated on whether to impose a duty to disclose. No clear guidance
exists in the common law pointing to when this duty arises, absent a
statute.
However, in a thorough analysis of caselaw in the United States
regarding duties to disclose, Zeiler and Krawiec found that such a duty is
more likely to be imposed where: 1) the defect to be disclosed was latent;
2) the information would update or correct previous disclosures; 3) full
disclosure is often required when the parties have a fiduciary or
confidential relationship; 4) illegally or tortuously-acquired information
exists; and 5) the uninformed party is a buyer or lessee.185 They also found
that courts had more sympathy for uninformed parties who are sick,
disabled, illiterate or elderly.186 And interestingly, unlike in civil law
systems, the authors found that common law courts are not more likely to
require disclosure when the parties are of unequal bargaining power.187

walk away from the negotiations.”); see generally Scott Timber Co. v. United States, 692
F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Market St. Assocs. L.P. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595–97
(7th Cir. 1991); Land O’Lakes v. Gonsalves, 281 F.R.D. 444, 453 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
182
Febbrajo, supra note 128, at 301, n.40.
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Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
184
Id.
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Kathryn Zeiler and Kimberly D. Krawiec, Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the
Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1880 (2005).
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Civil law takes a much stricter view of the duty to disclose, placing an
onus on the party with information to share that information if it is
necessary or proper to the uninformed party’s decision-making process.
The 2016 modified French law establishes a strict duty to inform (disclose)
during the contract negotiation.188 While this duty already existed for
certain consumer transactions, this modification turns that duty into a
general obligation to disclose any information that has a direct and
necessary link to the contract. The law establishes liability for a party that
fails to disclose necessary information in the course of contract
negotiations and may allow a right of contract rescission if a contract was
ultimately agreed upon.
While no-one can predict with certainty how the courts
will develop some of these concepts, the recent
codification in this area cries out for parties to ‘dress up’
and define the rules of courtship for prospective
commercial partnerships. Where negotiations sour, or
subsequent contractual performance disappoints, a failure
to dress up may lead to downsides much greater than
simply not holding on to your new partner.189
Finally, the new French law also imposes a general obligation of
confidentiality on the contract negotiation process.190 By establishing
liability for the disclosure to third parties of information obtained in the
course of the negotiation without authorization, parties are more restricted
in their ability to bargain between potential contract partners, playing
terms off of one another. This creates a new era of transparency in the
negotiation process while adding risk to the foreign investor hoping to
withhold information or bargain with multiple parties in the interest of
securing the best possible deal.

4. Reliance
In the absence of an agreement on material terms and a clear showing
of intent to be bound, common law courts rarely provide a remedy to a
party for commitments made during pre-contractual negotiations. The
costs associated with negotiating and preparing for the potential
eventuality of a contract are treated as sunk costs in the vast majority of
cases. Reliance is one exception to this rule. It is a precontractual remedy
188

CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1112-1 (Fr.).
Andrew Tetley & Aurélie Lopez, Pre-contractual Negotiations – A New Codified
French Regime, REED SMITH: CLIENT ALERTS, (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.reedsmith.com
/en/perspectives/2017/02/precontractual-negotiations--a-new-codified-french.
190
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1112-2 (Fr.).
189
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found in exceptional cases that go far beyond a basic negotiation.191 The
Restatement of Contracts explains that reliance is predicated upon
inducement into an agreement that fails to satisfy formal contract norms
and causes economic harm to the induced party.192
In common law, reliance is typically applied in cases where some
contract performance has already occurred under the guise of a quasicontract. This may allow for recovery of expenses incurred following the
acceptance of an offer to hire a performer who backs out before the
performance,193 making a bid based upon the bids of sub-contractors that
were ultimately rescinded,194 or where a distributor awarded a franchise
license to a party despite that distributor lacking the power to do so.195
Unlike most precontractual cases, each of these cases involves some
degree of contract performance.
The Red Owl v. Hoffman case has long been taught in U.S. law schools
as evidence of the ability of a party to recover reliance damages for
preparatory costs associated with contract negotiations.196 It is a case made
famous not only because of the surprising outcome (awarding damages in
the absence of any preliminary agreement) but also because of the colorful
characters in the story. It is important to discuss the case here in some
detail because it clearly exemplifies the legal analysis behind a claim of
liability for pre-contractual discussions in the common law. I will briefly
describe the case below.
In November 1959, Joseph Hoffman, the owner of a bakery in
Wautoma, Wisconsin, contacted Sid Jansen at Red Owl Stores to inquire
about setting-up a franchise. Discussions continued into the following year
when Edward Lukowitz took over for Jansen. To speed things along,
Hoffman decided he should get some experience in the grocery business,
191
See Hoffman v. Red Owl, 26 Wis. 2d 683 (1965) (providing reliance damages
following years of preliminary promises that failed to result in a formal contract).
192
Restatement (Second) Contracts § 90 states:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
193
Anglia Television v. Reed [1972] 1, 3-4 QB 60 (Eng.) (finding that expenditures made
both before and after the formation of the contract are recoverable).
194
Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal.2d 409 (1958) (finding reliance where a subsidiary
promise made to a principal contractor was relied upon with the expectation that it would
be accepted if the principal was awarded the contract). But see James Baird Co. v. Gimbel
Bros. Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933) (rejecting a finding of reliance where defendant
subcontractor rescinded bid prior to acceptance by contractor).
195
Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (1948) (awarding reliance damages based upon
knowledge by distributor that Goodman would rely on promises made).
196
26 Wis. 2d 683 (1965).
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so he bought a local grocery store for $16,000 in 1961 and advised
Lukowitz that he was doing this to “get a little experience” before taking
on a larger business like Red Owl.197 Hoffman ran the store at a profit, and
Red Owl representatives visited him in 1961.
Upon seeing Hoffman doing well, Lukowitz urged Hoffman to sell his
grocery business to his associate, Edward Wrysinski, so that he could free
up the cash he needed for the Red Owl franchise. Hoffman sold the store
at a $2,000 profit. Subsequently, Hoffman and Lukowitz jointly identified
a location for the new store, and Hoffman paid $1,000 for an option to
purchase a lot there. Red Owl was under the impression that Hoffman
would be selling his bakery in order to generate the cash to support the
Red Owl franchise, but Hoffman never intended to sell the bakery and
instead planned to take out a loan to get the funds needed for the franchise.
Over the next several months, Hoffman and Red Owl went back and
forth with a number of financing proposals requiring Hoffman to take out
a variety of loans, including taking out equity from his bakery, in order to
free enough cash for the franchise. Red Owl made statements such as, “we
are ready to go forward,” but still imposed additional barriers to a final
agreement. By February of 1962, Red Owl had imposed requirements that
Hoffman was unable to meet, leading Hoffman to withdraw from the
negotiation and threaten to sue Red Owl for “ill-advice.”
At a jury trial, Hoffman argued that he relied on the representations
made by Red Owl and, in so doing, suffered significant economic losses
by, among other things, selling his grocery store, purchasing a lot for the
Red Owl store, and selling his bakery building. The jury sided with
Hoffman and awarded him $20,000 in damages, an amount that included
the full value of the grocery store.
Red Owl appealed in 1965 on the issue of whether a party is entitled
to damages in a preliminary negotiation on the grounds of reliance, or
promissory estoppel.198 The court began its discussion by citing the
Restatement of Contracts explanation of promissory estoppel, which says:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance of a definite and
substantial character on the part of the promisee and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise.199

197

William C. Whitford & Stewart Macaulay, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores: The Rest of
the Story, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 801, 810 (2010).
198
Hoffman, 26 Wis. 2d 683 (1965).
199
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1933).
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In referring to a promise, the Restatement is speaking of
representations made by a party that would induce them to take certain
actions, which may ultimately be detrimental to them. The court explained
that if the representation made by the party is too indefinite to be
considered a promise, it would not support a claim of reliance.200 In this
case, the California Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that Red
Owl had made promises to Hoffman that he relied upon and that, despite
the fact that no manifestation of intent to conclude the contract was made
clear, Hoffman could reasonably have been expected to rely on those
promises. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision allowing
Hoffman to recover damages for reliance on Red Owl’s promises, though
the final amount awarded was reduced.
The Red Owl case is significant principally for two things: first, it is a
novel application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, or reliance,
which is generally reserved for negotiations that result in a fairly advanced
preliminary agreement, which was not the case here. And second, it is an
outlier in our precedential history of pre-contractual liability.201
In their study of over 100 cases presenting the issue of pre-contractual
liability between 1999 and 2003, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott found
that 87% of those cases resulted in no recovery for losses incurred.202 Only
cases involving misrepresentation or deceit led to recovery in their sample.
They concluded, “Courts consistently have denied recovery for precontractual reliance unless the parties, by agreeing on something
significant, indicated their intention to be bound.”203 Their suggestion is
that pre-contractual liability in the absence of intent to be bound or fraud
will not offer recovery to an injured party in a common law jurisdiction.

5. Revocability of Offers Prior to Acceptance
This final section regarding remedies briefly explains the issue of
revocability of an offer prior to acceptance. When an offeror makes an
offer to an offeree, a period of time may emerge between delivery of the
offer and acceptance or rejection of that offer. This period is particularly
dangerous for both parties as it can create unexpected results. If the offeror
chooses to rescind their offer prior to acceptance, the offeree may suffer
because they may have taken steps in reliance on that offer that caused
200
Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Myth of Pre-contractual Reliance,
68 OHIO ST. L. J.71, 1, 20–32 (2007) (discussing the “indefiniteness doctrine” and how
uncertain or unclear representations do not qualify as promises).
201
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 36, at 671–73 (describing a study of 105 cases between
1993 and 2003 that focused on recovery for pre-contractual liability and finding that 87%
denied recovery).
202
Id.
203
Id. at 673.
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them harm, such as refusing other offers or selling assets to acquire
resources to accept the offer. Yet if the offeree accepts while the offeror is
in the process of rescinding or after the offeror has had his offer accepted
by a third party, the offeror may be harmed by the dual exposure.
The Restatement and associated common law cases place much of the
power over the acceptance with the offeror rather than the offeree. Once
an offeror makes an offer, that offeror may rescind their offer at any time
prior to acceptance by the offeree. This rescission may be made through
direct communication,204 indirect communication,205 or, if it was a public
offer, through the same public means used to make the original offer.206
However, the offeree does have the ability to form a valid contract through
a variety of mechanisms, such as notifying the offeror,207 mailing an
acceptance,208 or performance of the terms of the agreement.209 Note that
the common law and UCC differ with respect to offer and acceptance
rules, yet both recognize the revocability of the offer prior to acceptance.210
The most significant distinction is with respect to offers that specify a time
for acceptance, which are generally temporarily irrevocable under civil
law but revocable under common law.
Under French law, for instance, the offeror may not rescind their offer
for the time specified in that offer or, if a time is not specified, for a
reasonable period of time.211 In addition, for consumer contracts, a French
consumer is permitted up to seven days to rescind their acceptance of a
purchase made from a professional.212 Germany has the strictest law in
terms of revocability. An offeror has no right to rescind once an offer has
been made.213 However, an offer under German law terminates after the
time period specified for acceptance or after a reasonable period of time.214
And under Dutch law, an offer is revocable at any time unless the offer
states a period of time for acceptance (similar to French law).215 It is
important to note here that the Convention on the International Sale of
204

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
Id. at § 43.
206
Id. at § 46.
207
Id. at § 56.
208
See id. at §§ 63(a), 66.
209
Id. at § 56 cmt. a. But see § 60 (requiring strict compliance with the terms of the offer
regarding the manner of permissible acceptance).
210
See U.C.C. § 2-206 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (allowing for
additional flexibility in the acceptance of an offer).
211
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Dec. 17, 1958,
D. Jur., 1959, 33 (Fr.). (preventing an offeror from rescinding their offer to sell a chalet
four days after that offer was made).
212
CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION art. L121-25, L311-15 (Fr.).
213
See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], §145 (Ger.).
214
Id. at §§ 146–49.
215
Art. 6:219 para. 1 BW (Neth.).
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Goods, which applies to commercial sales contracts in many civil and
some common law countries, splits the difference between these two
approaches. Offers are revocable any time prior to acceptance unless they
state a fixed time for acceptance, expressly indicate irrevocability, or it
would be reasonable to assume the offer was irrevocable.216
The above discussion above has identified four key areas of risk for
the unwitting cross-border entrepreneur. They highlight scenarios in
which a potential common law jurisdiction investor could be at risk for
liability based upon their precontractual words or deeds, and a potential
civil law jurisdiction investor at risk for losses stemming from the nonbinding words and deeds of a common law partner.

C. Theory
This section evaluates the relationship between legal tradition and the
level of entrepreneurial activity in that business environment in an attempt
to provide some insight into the deterrent effect of the risks discussed
above. Previous studies that have examined the linkage between common
law legal environments and more robust economic growth and business
development have focused their attention on the independence of the
courts, government involvement in private business matters, and contract
enforcement.217 And while an entrepreneur undoubtedly considers all of
these elements at some point in the formation and operation of their
business, most of them are matters with limited effect on the exploratory
phase of business development. Effective contract enforcement is essential
once a business relationship has been established and the entrepreneur
begins contracting with partners, laborers, suppliers, and so forth.
Effective judicial institutions are essential for ensuring that the
entrepreneur has a forum to pursue legal actions against breaching parties,
tortfeasors and the like.218 This was the central tenet of Nobel Laureate
Douglass North’s seminal work on the relationship between judicial
institutions and economic performance.219

216

United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Sale of Goods art. 16, Apr. 11, 1980,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 62; see also Joseph Lookofsky, The 1980
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS – CONTRACTS (Supp. 29) (Jacques H. Herbots
ed., 2000).
217
See LLSV, supra note 6; see also Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic
Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001) (highlighting the
importance of the common law’s limited government-involvement approach as a key driver
of economic growth).
218
See Kenneth W. Dam, The Judiciary and Economic Development (John M. Olin L. &
Econ., Working Paper No. 287, 2006).
219
North, supra note 1, at 100.
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North’s argument that effective contract enforcement, judicial
independence, and property rights create an environment that is conducive
to economic growth over time, is rooted in the perception of security that
those elements give to potential investors.220 When an investor is confident
that his or her contract has the weight of law behind it and an efficient
judiciary to enforce it, its value is significantly enhanced. However, it is
the absence of government interference in the pre-contractual stages of
commercial relationships that appears to lubricate the entrepreneurial
investment environment. During this exploratory stage, investors may
prefer the flexibility that non-enforceability of pre-contractual agreements
provide along with the security that a completed contract ensures.221
The exploratory phase for an entrepreneur may involve discussions
with potential partners, investors, and staff, existing business owners,
likely suppliers, and other service providers that will contribute to the
launch of the new endeavor.222 These discussions may involve certain
representations about the business or the potential relationship between the
parties. They may include commitments to take steps toward the
conclusion of a contract. And they may include promises to work together
in good faith toward a mutually beneficial goal.
The immediate legal concern for an entrepreneur operating within this
exploratory phase may be his or her potential liability for commitments
made before the business begins operations. In some cases, the
entrepreneur may make a handful of wise agreements with partners and
carry them all forward into the launch of the venture. However, for any
number of reasons, an entrepreneur may terminate negotiations with some
potential partners or may fail to launch the business at all.223 In those cases,
is the entrepreneur liable for commitments made to his or her potential
partners? This question is less easily answered than it may appear and is

220

Id. at 100–01.
See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs:
A Default Rule for Pre-contractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 680 (1993)
(discussing the increasing risk faced by parties as they approach more closely a finalized
contract).
222
See Laurel Delaney, 20 Factors to Consider Before Going Global, ENTREPRENEUR
(Dec. 16, 2004), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/75138 (laying out the steps for an
entrepreneur looking to go abroad).
223
See Alexandra Dickinson, How to Know when It’s Time to Walk Away from a
Negotiation, FORBES (Aug. 29 2017, 10:55 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
alexandradickinson/2017/08/29/how-to-know-when-its-time-to-walk-away-from-anegotiation/#3f400bb66112 (discussing the wish, want, and walk strategy for contract
negotiation); see also Ted Leonhardt, When to Walk Away from the Negotiating Table,
FAST COMPANY (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3057845/when-to-walkaway-from-the-negotiating-table (explaining how walking away can be a positive learning
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quite different in common and civil law jurisdictions, and the following
section explores this issue.
The contract is at the heart of commercial transactions. Contracts
underlie transactions such as leasing or buying land or facilities, hiring
staff, buying supplies and assets, financing the business, and of course,
interacting with customers and clients, just to name a few. In order to
assess, as a general matter, which legal tradition provides a more
hospitable environment for the creation of new businesses, we must
understand the contract formation process. And while most contracts begin
with a negotiation phase, not all negotiations lead to a contract. In the
business context, this period between the negotiation and the contract
execution is the area of most risk for the potential entrepreneur.
Negotiating a potential contract requires risk-taking.224 Resources
must be devoted to the negotiation process, and many potential deals are
discarded when better deals appear on the horizon.225 An effective
negotiation is not necessarily the one that ends in a perfect deal; it is the
one that ends in the best possible deal given the circumstances. Knowing
this, negotiators may pursue multiple deals simultaneously, sometimes
leveraging benefits offered by one against a deal offered by another.226 In
each case, the negotiator is putting the entire deal at risk in the interest of
securing as much as they can from the other party. But that is not the only
risk involved in contract negotiations.
In order to extract promises from another party, contract negotiators
usually have to make promises themselves.227 Those promises may be
broad or specific, clear or ambiguous, reliable or not. But without
promises, there is little for the parties to negotiate. Yet promises made
during a contract negotiation are intended for only one function—to
discover what will be given in return if a contract is agreed upon. A buyer
may promise to purchase all of a manufacturer’s stock, but if the
manufacturer responds with a price the buyer objects to, the buyer’s
promise may be moot as he may choose not to do business with that
manufacturer. What rights does the manufacturer have to enforce that
buyer’s promise? Was the buyer’s promise enforceable? That all depends
on the legal environment in which they are negotiating.
224

See Kostritsky, supra note 221, at 679; see also Juliet P. Kostirtsky, Uncertainty,
Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations and the Holdup Problem, 61 S.M.U. L. REV. 1377,
1384–85 (2008).
225
See David B. Falk, The Art of Contract Negotiation, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 22–23
(1992).
226
See George Siedel & Helena Haapio, Using Proactive Law for Competitive
Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 641 (2010) (discussing the use of contract law to gain strategic
advantage in negotiations).
227
See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Promises, Trust, and Contract Law, 47 AM. J. OF JURIS. 25,
26 (2002).
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A legal environment in which liability attaches for representations
made or disclosures withheld during the negotiation phase adds a layer of
risk to the party that may not be ready to commit to a formal contract yet.228
On the contrary, such an environment provides additional protections to
the party that takes steps in reliance on the representations made by the
party unwilling to commit to the formal contract. This difference may be
significant, creating risk for parties hoping to negotiate with multiple
partners, and opportunity for parties in a weaker negotiating position.

D. Methodology
The question that this article poses is the following: does legal
tradition, due to differences in pre-contractual rules, affect a foreign
investor’s appetite for new investments? In other words, does the risk of
liability during contract negotiations help or hinder opportunities for
entrepreneurial growth?
A straightforward way to answer this question would be to compare
outcomes in cases of pre-contractual liability across common and civil law
jurisdictions by reviewing jurisprudence and judgments. However, in the
case of both common and civil law countries, such cases rarely manifest
in judicial opinions that can be used for comparative analysis.229 Most
cases of this ilk are resolved through negotiation or commercial arbitration
where no opinions are readily accessible.230 Thus, another approach is
necessary to resolve this question.
The second-best approach to answering this question seems to be
through statistical analysis accompanied by a small sampling of anecdotes
from cross-border transactional attorneys. With this approach, we can
draw inferences from changes in the investment environment over time
and contrast those changes across legal environments. For the statistical
analysis, I assess whether there is a significant relationship between legal
tradition and total entrepreneurial activity over time. For the qualitative
inquiry, I inquired of numerous international practitioners in common and
civil law jurisdictions to determine their awareness and level of counseling
on pre-contractual liability risks.231 I received substantive responses from
ten practitioners across civil and common law legal systems. Together, the
228

Cardenas, supra note 124, at 947–48 (discussing the different approaches to risk in
merger and acquisition agreement negotiations).
229
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 36, at 691 (applying data from appellate contract
breach cases rather than breaches of pre-contractual obligations because such agreements
are “sometimes unwritten and, moreover, are not collected.”).
230
See id.
231
Practitioners were identified via the American Bar Association’s International
Commercial Transactions electronic group and the American Society for International
Law.
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data and analysis will provide useful insights into the effects of legal
tradition on investor risk.

1. Quantitative Inquiry
The quantitative analysis component of this study will use the number
of start-up businesses formed between common law and civil law
jurisdictions as a proxy measure of entrepreneurial activity across
countries as the dependent variable, and legal tradition as the independent
variable. Measured over a period of years, this proxy measure will reflect
how entrepreneurial activity has changed over time and whether there is a
significant difference of growth in countries that follow common or civil
law legal traditions. A regression analysis will help show the existence and
strength of any such relationship.
To measure the number of start-up firms in different countries, I will
use the Global Entrepreneurship Survey (GES), which is one of the most
comprehensive and widely used tools for measuring entrepreneurial
activity around the world.232 The survey is conducted by the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), a joint effort between Babson College
and London Business School that provides data on entrepreneurship for
researchers around the world.233 Their annual survey assesses developed
and emerging markets around the world on a number of factors that
influence entrepreneurial activity in those countries.
Innovation has been identified in the National Framework Conditions
as the third stage of economic development, following factor-driven and
efficiency-driven economies. According to the GEM:
The GEM conceptual framework derives from the basic
assumption that national economic growth is the result of
the personal capabilities of individuals to identify and
seize opportunities, and that this process is affected by
environmental factors which influence individuals’
decisions to pursue entrepreneurial initiatives.234
The GEM measures entrepreneurial activity in three stages: 1) Total
Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity, which identifies adults starting or
operating a new business within the previous 42 months; 2) Rate of
Established Businesses, which includes adults owning or operating a
business for more than the past 42 months; and, 3) Business
232

Global Reports, GLOBAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR, https://www.gemconsortium
.org/report (last visited Jan. 23, 2019).
233
See What is GEM?, GLOBAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR, https://www.
gemconsortium.org/about/news (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
234
GEM GLOBAL REPORT 2016/17 14 (2017), https://www.gemconsortium.org/report.
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Discontinuation Rate, which includes adults who have discontinued a
business in the past 12 months.235 The data includes responses from
surveys distributed in 64 countries. The next section includes the results
from both the quantitative and qualitative analyses.
According to the National Expert Survey, also conducted by the GEM,
the second most important factor taken into account by early-stage
entrepreneurs following physical infrastructure is the commercial and
legal infrastructure.236 North America has the most supportive
entrepreneurship ecosystem, while Latin American and Africa struggle
with the least favorable entrepreneurship conditions. 237 “Perhaps it is no
coincidence that North America is made up of countries with common law
jurisdictions whereas Latin America and Africa are composed of civil
jurisdiction countries.”238
To determine which legal environment is more hospitable to
entrepreneurial activity, I extracted data from ten years of the GEM survey
identifying total early-stage entrepreneurial activity in 64 countries and
notated the type of legal system utilized in each of those countries. I further
divided those countries by legal tradition, as displayed in Figure 1, below.

Figure 1. Countries from 2016 GEM Survey by Legal Tradition.
Because the focus of this article is on only common and civil law legal
traditions, I have eliminated the religious and mixed systems from the
remainder of the analysis. Of the remaining countries that were surveyed
by the GEM report, I calculated the average early-stage entrepreneurial
235
236
237
238
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Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 31.
Id.
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activity among the civil law countries and among the common law
countries. Such activity in common law countries was only slightly higher,
on average, than in civil law countries, as noted in Figure 2, below.

Figure 2. Average Early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity.
The difference in the two legal traditions with respect to early-stage
entrepreneurial activity becomes much clearer when filtering countries by
stage of development. Factor-driven economies are countries that pursue
competitive advantage exclusively on the basis of factor endowments,
such as natural resources. Investment-driven economies are those
countries that focus on manufacturing of basic goods to drive economic
growth. And innovation-driven economies are advanced economies that
have solid infrastructure and legal institutions that facilitate investment in
technologies that give these countries competitive advantages over factordriven and efficiency-driven economies.239
For the purposes of this analysis, I have chosen to focus only on
innovation-driven economies (see Table 1, below). These economies
encourage foreign investment and, in most instances, maintain laws that
allow such investments. I broke down the data above into groupings based
upon their stage of development as notated by the GEM report—factordriven, efficiency-driven, and innovation-driven.240 Countries falling
within the category of “innovation-driven” economies are those that are
characterized as having strong institutions and incentives driving

239

See, e.g., Stages of Development, HARV. BUS. SCH., http://www.isc.hbs.edu/
competitiveness-economic-development/frameworks-and-key-concepts/pages/shapes-ofdevelopment.aspx (describing the distinctions between stages of economic development).
240
GEM GLOBAL REPORT 2017/18 17–18 (2018) (defining the stages of development).
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innovation.241 The risks associated with investment in factor- or
investment-driven economies include political and economic instability,
risks that are less prevalent in the innovation-driven economies. Countries
that meet these criteria are listed below:
Table 1. Innovation-driven Countries Segmented by Legal Tradition.

Again, taking the average early-stage entrepreneurial activity
percentage from each of these countries and comparing them by legal
tradition, the stark contrast between the two becomes evident. The figure
below represents the division between civil law and common law
innovation-driven economies (see Figure 3, below).

241

Stages of Development, supra note 239.
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Figure 3. Innovation Driven Economies Segmented by Legal Tradition.
This data represents the situation in the current climate. But has there
been a consistent advantage of common law systems over civil law
systems in promoting entrepreneurial economic activity? To answer this,
I extracted data from ten years of GEM surveys and measured the effect
of legal tradition—common vs. civil law—on total entrepreneurial activity
among innovation-driven economies over this period. The result was that
in innovation-driven economies, legal tradition had a significant impact on
the level of entrepreneurial activity (see Table 2 and Figure 5, below).
The analysis is limited by the number of observations and the amount
of available comparable data for the time period. I utilized GEM data from
2001 through 2016 for all civil and common law countries in their dataset.
The GEM surveys 54 countries covering 86% of global GDP.242 I then
added the following independent variables: 1) stage of development
(efficiency-driven, factor-driven or innovation-driven); 2) degree of
contract enforcement;243 3) perceived opportunities to form a firm; 4) fear
of failure rate; 5) percentage of individuals intending to start a new
business in the next three years; and, 6) Total Early-Stage Entrepreneurial
Activity.
The regression below includes civil law (Group 0) and common law
(Group 1) countries only. Data was gathered from GEM surveys between
2006 and 2016 for which data was available. A combined 284 observations
were used in this calculation. The null hypothesis used here is that there is
no difference in level of entrepreneurial activity between civil and
common law legal systems. The resulting P-value is significant at the .001
242
243

GLOBAL REPORT 2017/18, supra note 240, at 11.
WORLD BANK GROUP, DOING BUSINESS 2017 (14th ed. 2017).
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level, meaning that we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there
is likely a significant difference in levels of entrepreneurial activity
between civil and common law countries based upon legal tradition.
Table 2. T-Test with equal variance comparing means of civil and
common law systems against total entrepreneurial activity.

Figure 4. Graphical representation of T-Test comparing means of civil and
common systems against total entrepreneurial activity.
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Figure 5. Regression analysis of the effects of legal tradition on total
entrepreneurial activity.
The regression (see Figure 5, above) was conducted to assess the
correlation between legal tradition and total entrepreneurial activity
(TEA). Three control factors were used—the rule of law factor, which
measures investor risk based upon the legal and political climate; the
Entrepreneurial Intentions factor,244 which measures perceived investment
opportunities in the target market; and the contract factor, which measures
the perceived security of contracts.245 The regression shows that
approximately 65% of the impact on TEA stems from the factors
accounted for in this analysis. It also shows that legal system, represented
by “system_n,” is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level,
indicating a strong impact on TEA.
The T-Test and regression displayed above show a correlation
between legal system and entrepreneurial activity in innovation-driven
economies; however, it must be noted that correlation does not equate to
causation. A number of other factors could be affecting the investment
environment, including political risk, market size, and the governing
environment in which the investment would be made. Nevertheless, other
studies using distinct methodologies have found that there is good reason
to conclude that legal tradition affects the economic environment.
The most well-known economic analysis of legal traditions and their
impact on the economic environment was conducted by World Bank
researchers in 2008.246 In that study, the researchers concluded that
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Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. OF ECON. LIT. 285
(2008) (finding that common law countries typically performed better in economic
performance indicators than civil law countries).
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common law countries tended to fare better in the areas of institutions,
judicial independence, and investor protections.247 These are some of the
same criteria that create an environment conducive to entrepreneurial
activity. But in order to link these findings to pre-contractual liability, we
must assess whether it is in fact the risk of pre-contractual liability that is
deterring investors from operating as frequently in civil law countries as
they are in common law countries. For this, a qualitative analysis is
necessary.

2. Qualitative Inquiry
While the quantitative data shows that there is a significant
relationship between legal tradition and entrepreneurial activity over time,
this does not necessarily mean that it is pre-contractual liability per se that
drives the difference. We do know that legal tradition influences
investment,248 and many factors—including the use of precedent,
adversarial proceedings, or even the influence of juries—may have an
impact on the decision of which legal system should govern a
transaction.249 Nevertheless, one of the factors that may drive the initial
decision by an investor about which country to invest in is their confidence
in the negotiation process. Whether they will be required to disclose
adverse information, attest to representations that may hurt their
bargaining position, or negotiate in good faith at all, may affect the
strength of the position of the investor.
To add context to the quantitative analysis above, I asked several
cross-border legal practitioners in both civil and common law countries
about their sense of investment risk related to distinctions in precontractual liability. My conversations included the General Counsel of a
Dutch multinational company,250 an Italian attorney from Price
Waterhouse Coopers,251 and attorneys at law firms in Ecuador,252
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Argentina,253 Uruguay,254 Indonesia,255 Poland,256 and the United States.257
An overview of those informative conversations is included below.
According to the general counsel of a major Dutch multinational
company, the risks of pre-contractual liability differ depending on which
side of the transaction the investor sits.258 A buyer of goods, services, or
intellectual property would be better protected in an environment that
requires full disclosures and good faith negotiation, which they would find
in a civil law environment. Likewise, an investor selling goods, services,
or intellectual property would be better positioned in an environment that
allows the parties to choose what to disclose or represent and that does not
statutorily establish requirements for the negotiation process, which would
be the case in a common law jurisdiction. This is part of the reason why
common law contracts, which must spell-out such pre-contractual
measures, tend to be significantly longer and more thorough than civil law
contracts, which can look to statutes to provide such measures.259
A U.S. legal practitioner suggested that the major risk apparent in precontractual liability between legal systems exists in the good faith
negotiating requirements that are present in civil but not common law
jurisdictions.260 The German legal concept of culpa in contrahendo, which
obligates negotiating parties to act in good faith, establishes clear statutory
requirements on negotiating parties before a contract is formed. A
thorough analysis of this concept and the risks that it poses was published
in 1964:
Once parties enter into negotiations for a contract, the
sweeping language of the cases informs us, a relationship
of trust and confidence comes into existence, irrespective
of whether they succeed or fail. Thus, protection is
accorded against blameworthy conduct which prevents
the consummation of a contract. A party is liable for
negligently creating the expectation that a contract would
253
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be forth- coming although he knows or should know that
the expectation cannot be realized.261
However, as that practitioner noted, there are provisions in U.S. law
that account for the absence of statutory requirements to negotiate in good
faith. Among others, mistake,262 misrepresentation,263 negligence264 and
estoppel265 might be argued as grounds to seek damages if a contract
resulted. The major difference in the legal traditions here is that common
law will not generally provide remedies for failed negotiations due to bad
faith where no contract resulted, whereas civil law may impose liability
even in the absence of a contract.
Across all of the practitioners that I spoke with, the risks were
recognized, but clients were rarely counseled to choose a particular market
on the basis of legal tradition as it relates to pre-contractual liability. This
would seem to make sense as it is the legal practitioner that would be best
positioned to craft language in letters of intent and other pre-contractual
documents that would protect their client in any legal system. Thus, what
the data appears to tell us is that the risks of negotiating in a common law
environment, where little protection exists for pre-contractual promises,
can be mitigated by effective legal counsel.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article began with a single question—do differences in precontractual liability between civil and common law jurisdictions affect the
entrepreneurial environment in those jurisdictions? I conducted a
quantitative analysis that showed a significant relationship between legal
tradition and entrepreneurial activity. I then used interviews with crossjurisdictional attorneys and extensive historical and current legal
assessments to add context to the quantitative findings. The research
shows legal traditions do affect the risk for entrepreneurs across legal
environments; however, that risk can be mitigated with effective legal
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guidance and understanding of the differing degrees to which an investor’s
pre-contractual statements will affect his or her liability. Entrepreneurs
operating without legal counsel equipped in cross-jurisdictional practice
face the most significant risks.
This article, then, serves as a starting point for a broader discussion of
inconsistencies across legal traditions with respect to commercial
transactions. Globalization and interdependence have made cross-border
contracts an almost foregone conclusion. Yet as business speeds ahead to
find the best commercial relationships around the world, the law has yet
to catch-up by providing predictable and consistent rules for commercial
transactions across jurisdictions. And while earnest attempts to smooth
over these choppy waters have been made in the past,266 parties with
experienced legal counsel have preferred to resort to choice-of-law clauses
that import their home rules and arbitration clauses that cut-out local courts
in order to create the predictability that is missing in the judicial system.
Unwitting and bold entrepreneurs who choose to wade into the murky
waters of cross-border contracts without experienced counsel may find
themselves in dangerous territory.267 It is here that we must focus our
inquiry to ensure that micro and small enterprises can take full advantage
of the global business environment while minimizing the risks that are
inherent in cross-border contract negotiation.
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